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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1993

ARTHUR CALDERON, Warden of
San Quentin Prison and
DANIEL E. LUNGREN,
Attorney General

Petitioners,

v.

BERNARD LEE HAMILTON,

Respondent.

APPENDICES (VOLUME II) TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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166 pp

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

APPENDIX B

United States District Court
Souther District of California
Order Denying Petitions
For Writ of Habeas Corpus;
Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law B-110 - B-273

APPENDIX C

United States Supreme Court
of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit Order C-274

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Filed Aug. 23, 1991

BERNARD LEE HAMILTON, Petitioner, vs. DANIEL VASQUEZ, Warden of San Quentin and DANIEL LUNGREN, Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents.	Civil No. 86-2102-B Consolidated with Civil No. 90-0291-B ORDER DENYING PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Upon remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and after reviewing the entire record and conducting an evidentiary hearing, it is hereby ordered that the amended and consolidated petitions for writ of habeas corpus are denied.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 2, 1981, petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder of

Eleanor Buchanan.[1/] On direct appeal, and upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of death. People v. Hamilton, 45 Cal.3d 351 (1988) (Hamilton II), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1047 (1989).

A. Federal Habeas Petitions

Through March, 1990, petitioner filed five separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising exhausted, unexhausted, and repetitive claims.

1. Petition Number One: 86-0809-T

In his first petition, filed on April 2, 1986, petitioner raised claims relating to ineffective assistance of counsel,

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1. The basic factual circumstances of the crime and the case against petitioner are described in People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal.3d 408, 413-19 (1985) (Hamilton I), vacated, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986). Those facts which are relevant to this court's analysis of petitioner's specific habeas claims are set out below as Findings of Fact.

denial of the right to self-representation, and denial of due process. The district court denied the petition on the merits on August 26, 1986. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment as premature because petitioner had not exhausted state remedies. The district court was instructed to dismiss the petition without prejudice to refiling the claims following exhaustion, which it did on September 30, 1987.

2. Petition Number Two: 86-2101-B

The second petition, filed on October 9, 1986, charged that the shackling of petitioner at trial was unconstitutional. This court denied the petition on the merits on November 19, 1987. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings on August 23, 1989, instructing the court to examine the entire trial court record. Hamilton v.

Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989). This petition is resolved in this order.

3. Petition Number Three: 88-1148-B

The third petition raised the same issues asserted and dismissed without prejudice in 86-0809-T. This court dismissed the petition on August 31, 1988. On September 7, 1990, the Ninth Circuit dismissed petitioner's appeal, finding it moot in light of the previous ruling in Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).

4. Petition Number Four: 89-0993-B

The fourth petition was filed on June 20, 1989, in the Norther District of California. This petition raised claims relating to access to the prison law library, denial of effective assistance of counsel, denial of a fair trial, and

denial of due process. Upon transfer to this district, the petition was dismissed on July 19, 1989, as this court concluded that the asserted grounds for relief "either have been or should have been presented by previous petitions . . . ." See Order, July 19, 1989.

5. Petition Number Five: 90-0291-B

The fifth petition states the same allegations contained in the first and third petitions, and was amended on October 18, 1990. This petition has been consolidated with 86-2101-B and is resolved by this order.

B. Consolidation of Federal Petitions

On February 26, 1990, upon motion of respondent and after remand of 86-2101-B, this court ordered petitioner to inform the court within ninety days of any and all additional habeas claims of which he

was aware. See Order, March 6, 1990. In response to this order, on June 8, 1990 petitioner filed a list of 36 potential claims, including claims which had been raised in earlier state and federal petitions. Petitioner conceded that many of the claims identified in his response were unexhausted pursuant to Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 590 (1982).

On June 8, 1990, in order to allow petitioner to bring all appropriate claims in federal court at one time, this court consolidated the petitions pending in 86-2101-B and 90-0291-B, and permitted petitioner until August 8, 1990 to exhaust all unexhausted claims in state court. See Order, June 21, 1990. The consolidated cases were stayed to permit the exhaustion of any unexhausted claims in state court. Id. To the extent petitioner filed new claims in state court, this court indicated that it would

allow petitioner to amend his federal petition with respect to any newly exhausted claims upon completion of the state court proceedings. Id. On August 2, 1990, at petitioner's request, this court extended the time by which plaintiff was to file unexhausted claims in state court from August 8, 1990 to August 20, 1990. See Order, August 17, 1990.

On August 21, 1990, petitioner stated that he had failed to file any identified and unexhausted claims in state court in response to this court's instruction. However, instead of deeming all such claims waived, this court granted petitioner a further extension until October 22, 1990 to file any additional unexhausted state claims with the state court, and any additional exhausted

federal habeas claims in federal court. See Order, September 18, 1990.[2/]

Further, this court stated that if petitioner did seek to exhaust any claims in state court, consideration of the consolidated federal habeas corpus petitions would be stayed until all of the state claims were exhausted. Id. However, petitioner was explicitly notified that on October 22, 1990, without further court order, he would be deemed to have waived and abandoned any and all (1) habeas corpus claims not yet filed in state court; and (2) habeas corpus claims that have been exhausted in state court,

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2. This order was incorrectly captioned with respect to the respondents' identity and the case number. The court issued a nunc pro tunc order on October 15, 1990, rectifying the error. Petitioner has never claimed any prejudice as a result of this error, and it is clear that all parties were aware that the order, although miscaptioned, applied to the pending consolidated cases.

but not yet filed in federal court. Id. at para. 3.

In ordering the above procedure, this court declared that it was seeking to avoid seriatim petitions and the delay which the filing of such petitions regularly introduces into the federal habeas system. At the same time, the court sought to ensure that petitioner was not forced to sacrifice any viable claims, and therefore petitioner was afforded every opportunity to exhaust his state claims and consolidate his federal petition.[3/] See Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1988) (Alacron, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom.

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3. Cumulatively, petitioner has had nearly eight months, from February 26, 1990 through October 22, 1990, to exhaust, amend, and consolidate his claims. If at any time during that period petitioner has filed unexhausted claims in state court, this court, as previously stated, would have stayed the federal proceedings until such claims were exhausted.

Demosthenes v. Neuschafer, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991).

On October 18, 1990, petitioner, acting on his own behalf, filed an amendment to his previously filed petition in Case No. 90-0291.[4] On October 22, 1990, petitioner's appointed counsel filed an amended consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus, encompassing numerous claims raised in the earlier petitions. Neither petitioner nor his counsel filed any unexhausted claims with the state court. By order dated November 21, 1990, this court accepted both documents as timely, and ruled that petitioner had now voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally

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4. Under the circumstances of this case, the court determined that it would be appropriate to allow petitioner to maintain an in propria persona role even though he has been represented throughout the proceedings by competent appointed counsel. The court's rationale in this regard is discussed below in Section X, Findings of Fact 124-26.

waived and abandoned any and all habeas claims not yet filed in state court, and any exhausted claims not yet filed in federal court, in accordance with this court's order of September 18, 1990.

After respondents answered the petitions and petitioner and his counsel filed their respective traverses, this court conducted a three week evidentiary hearing on all appropriate claims asserted by petitioner. Petitioner was transported to this court from San Quentin, was allowed to confer regularly with counsel throughout the evidentiary hearing, and testified at length during said hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, both sides waived oral closing argument, choosing instead to file post-hearing briefs.

Upon careful consideration of the amended and consolidated petitions, the entire trial record, the evidence received

during the evidentiary hearing, and the post-hearing briefs, this court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

II. THE SHACKLING OF PETITIONER AT TRIAL

A. Findings of Fact

1. On Thursday, September 18, 1980, prior to the start of trial, petitioner's trial counsel, Thomas Ryan, informed Judge Gill in a closed hearing that the had requested that petitioner be placed in restraints by courthouse security personnel. 21 R.T. 154.[5/] Petitioner was present in restraints. In explaining this request, Ryan informed the court of two separate incidents in which

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5. R.T. refers to the transcript prepared below during petitioner's trial proceedings, and P.H.T. refers to the transcript of the preliminary hearing. E.H. refers to transcripts of the evidentiary hearing conducted by this court. Volumes within the R.T. and P.H.T. series are identified by cardinal numbers, and volumes within the E.H. series are identified by roman numerals.

petitioner had acted violently towards members of his defense staff. Id. at 157.

2. The first such incident occurred on Sunday, September 7, 1980, when petitioner attacked Patricia Robinson, who had been retained by Ryan to assist with jury selection. Id. The attack occurred in the interview room in the jail, while Robinson was meeting with petitioner. Id. at 157. During the hearing on September 18, 1980, Robinson stated that "it was a physical attack on me . . . ." Id. at 162. Robinson noted that she believed the purpose of the attack was "to stall the trial . . . and to provide some excuse so that he would not have to assume responsibility of being in attendance at trial." Id. In stating her beliefs as to petitioner's motivations, Robinson did not downplay or seek to minimize the actual physical nature of the attack.

3. The second incident related to the court occurred on Wednesday, September 17, 1980, when Ryan met with petitioner in the interview room at the jail. Id. at 158. Petitioner handed Ryan a letter, and while Ryan was putting the letter into his briefcase, petitioner punched Ryan in the face, knocking him to the floor. Id. With Ryan on the ground, petitioner simply left the room. Id.

4. In addition to the two incidents described above, Ryan also informed Judge Gill on September 18, 1980, of his belief "that [petitioner] would disrupt the proceedings not only in the jail as he did by hitting me, but that he would disrupt the proceedings in the trial court by either hitting me or some member of the staff or judge . . . ." Id. at 159.

5. Petitioner was allowed to relate his version of the subject incidents. Petitioner claimed that he was not seeking to delay the trial, but had merely grown frustrated with what he perceived to be the deteriorating attorney-client relationship between himself, Ryan, and co-counsel Vivian Camberg. Id. at 163-65. Petitioner did not deny that the incidents took place.

6. At the conclusion of the hearing on September 18, 1980, Judge Gill took no explicit action, and did not order the shackles removed. Id. at 166-69.

7. On Wednesday, September 24, 1980, the parties appeared before the trial judge, the Honorable Franklin B. Orfield, to argue in limine motions. No jury was present. Because of the request made by Ryan on September 18, 1980, petitioner appeared in shackles. 72 R.T.

1. Upon petitioner's request to be unshackled so that he could handle his papers and take notes during the proceedings, Ryan again interjected his belief that the restraints should remain on petitioner. Id. at 1-2. In order to resolve this issue at the outset, the court reconvened the proceedings in camera and excluded the prosecutors. Id. at 2.

8. During the in camera hearing, Ryan informed the court of petitioner's earlier attacks, and his belief that petitioner "might very well impulsively, without thinking about it, either attack me, the court clerk, Miss Camberg, or anyone." Id. at 4.

9. The court allowed petitioner to state his position relative to shackles, and petitioner noted that he was co-counsel in this case, "not simply a defendant trying to take notes and stuff." Id. at 5. Petitioner further observed

that he had appeared in court on numerous occasions and had not acted inappropriately during any of those appearances. Id. In addition, petitioner stated his understanding that any in-court outbursts would be counterproductive to his defense. Id. at 6.

10. Although petitioner stated that he had not engaged in any prior courtroom outbursts, he was unable to state categorically that such outbursts might no occur in the future, observing, "As a matter of fact, why should there be [an outburst] unless Mr. Ryan is conducting himself in a manner that he realizes he shouldn't. Any why should he worry about that?" Id. at 5-6. Viewed in the context of petitioner's mounting frustration and apparent inability to control himself, this court finds that this statement constituted a veiled threat by petitioner to act violently in the

courtroom should his displeasure with Ryan reach a level known only to him.

11. After hearing from Ryan and petitioner, Judge Orfield ruled that petitioner would remain shackled. Id. at 9. Because of petitioner's potential for acting violently in court, Judge Orfield specifically stated that he was concerned with the safety of Ryan, Camberg, the court clerk, the court reporter, and any other officers of the court. Id. at 8.

12. On Thursday, October 2, 1980, Judge Orfield conducted a second in camera hearing on the shackling issue, during which Ryan requested that the shackles be removed from petitioner. Id. at 31. In making this request, Ryan stated that further conversations with petitioner and with other defense attorneys in the community had caused him

to reconsider his original request that petitioner be shackled. Id. at 30-31.

13. During the in camera hearing on October 2, 1980, Ryan also further expounded on his reasons for initially requesting that petitioner be shackled, informing Judge Orfield for the first time that Robinson had related to Ryan statements by petitioner indicating that "he would disrupt the trial; that he would make an attack on either myself or the bailiff, or perhaps even the judge." Id. at 32.

14. As an alternative to shackling, Ryan informed the court "that there are knee-type restraints that can be worn under Mr. Hamilton's trousers that would not be apparent, that would provide some security." Id. at 34.

15. In considering the request that petitioner be unshackled in court, Judge Orfield ordered bailiff

Andrus to investigate with jail authorities "if there is any reason that they know of why, from a security standpoint, we shouldn't release the shackles, and if there is not, I will order that they be released." Id. at 36. As this passage indicates, petitioner was put on notice by Judge Orfield that his general demeanor, both in and out of court, would be important in determining the security risk posed by petitioner while in court. In other words, this court finds that petitioner figuratively possessed the key to the shackles, and was aware that he controlled his own destiny relative to shackling.

16. Approximately thirty minutes later, Judge Orfield announced in open court that petitioner would be unshackled and would wear a leg brace. 26 R.T. 2. With petitioner in a restrictive leg brace under his trousers, jury

selection commenced later in the afternoon, and at the end of the day the court recessed until Monday, October 6, 1980. Up to this point, petitioner had never been seen by an prospective jurors in any form of restraint.

17. On Monday, October 6, 1980, Ryan interrupted jury selection to inform the court, out of the hearing of the jury, that petitioner "would rather have the leg irons than the knee brace," because the brace had allegedly become painful. 27 R.T. 98. According to petitioner, the problem with the knee brace was "not that it's too tight, it's just the position of it, it's bearing up into my nerves in my leg and it's more or less cutting off the circulation or cutting off that nerve, period." Id. at pp. 99-100. Petitioner explained to the court that he had previously received

medical treatment for nerve problems in his legs. Id. at 99.

18. Upon receiving petitioner's complaint, Judge Orfield inquired as to the availability of any other type of leg brace. Id. at 100. According to the bailiff, "there was one other type but that is not available." Id. Petitioner again stated his willingness to proceed in leg chains rather than the brace. Id.

19. After Judge Orfield requested and reviewed California authority on the shackling issue, he concluded that "under the circumstances" petitioner "should be afforded an opportunity to start the trial without restraints . . . ." Id. at 127. After this ruling, the court proceeded with jury selection on October 6 and 7, 1980, with petitioner present and completely unrestrained.

20. On the morning of Wednesday, October 8, 1980, an incident occurred at the jail which renewed the court's concerns with respect to courtroom security. Upon learning of the incident, Judge Orfield immediately conducted a hearing outside the presence of the prospective jurors. 29 R.T. 374.

21. During the hearing on October 8, 1980, Deputy Christiansen testified that when he arrived at the jail at 7:45 a.m., petitioner had not been "brought down" for transport to court. Id. at 375. In his own testimony during this hearing, petitioner conceded that he had not responded with Deputy Scully twice tried to wake him so that he could prepare for court. Id. at 393-94. Instead, after Scully's second attempt, petitioner asked Scully to check his file to determine if the file contained a written agreement between the court and Captain Nichols as

to special wake-up arrangements for petitioner. Id. at 394.

22. Deputy Christiansen testified that he had heard from several other deputies that petitioner "feels he has this agreement" pursuant to which he is to be "brought down" only between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., even though "most people are generally brought down at a quarter after 6:00 in the morning." Id. at 375.

23. On the morning of October 8, 1980, Deputy Christiansen checked petitioner's file and found no such agreement or other reference to special arrangements. Id. at 376.

24. After confirming that there was no such agreement, Deputy Christiansen, accompanied by Deputies Hansen and Wilderman, went to petitioner's cell, opened it, and ordered petitioner to get up for court. Id. at 376. Petitioner

did not respond, except to roll over. Id. at 377. In an effort to awaken petitioner, the deputies removed his blanket, "at which time he jumped to his feet, clenched both fists and moved to the back of the cell . . . ." Id. The deputies subdued petitioner, removed him from the cell, placed him against the external wall in a prone position, and shackled him. Id. As the deputies attempted to move defendant, "he continued to struggle, tried to break free . . . and spat in the face of Deputy Hansen." Id.

25. Throughout this incident, Deputy Christiansen testified that petitioner "continued a verbal onslaught the entire time, referring to the deputies as cowards for not removing the chains so he could fight one on one." Id.

26. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Sergeant Runyen arrived at the jail

control area, and observed the deputies "bringing Bernard Hamilton down in chains." Id. at 387. Sergeant Runyen testified that petitioner was wearing just his jail undershorts at this time. Id. Petitioner was placed in a holding tank and given his clothes to dress for court. Id. After petitioner had dressed, Sergeant Runyen opened the door to the holding tank and asked petitioner "what the problem was . . . ." Id. Petitioner complained that the deputies had mistreated him, and requested that he be allowed to return to his cell to "wash up for court." Id. at 388. Because petitioner had already been afforded "ample time" to get ready for court, but had voluntarily chosen to stay in bed, this request was refused. Id. Upon Runyen's refusal, petitioner undressed, and he was transported to court in a blanket and undershorts. Id. Petitioner

was not offensive towards Runyen during this conversation. Id.

27. During cross-examination by Ryan, neither Deputy Christiansen nor Sergeant Runyen deviated from the version of events described above. Id. at 381-386, 388.

28. Petitioner testified that Deputy Christiansen harbored personal animosity towards him, which had resulted in several previous confrontations. Id. at 390. Petitioner disputed Deputy's Christiansen's version of the incident in the cell, and claimed that he was roughly snatched out of bed, slammed against the wall, and handcuffed, causing him to suffer a split lip and a cut on his wrist. Id. at 395.

29. Based on petitioner's testimony before Judge Orfield and the testimony received at the evidentiary hearing, this court finds petitioner's

version of events incredible and unworthy of belief. According to Robinson, petitioner had previously indicated his intent to prevent the trial from going forward, even if it required an attack on the jail deputies. See IX E.H. 49-50. Robinson testified that petitioner had explicitly stated prior to his incident that "[h]e wasn't going to come down for a particular court hearing. If he had to fight with the guards, the guards would not be able to make him come down to appear in court for a particular hearing." Id.[6]

30. After hearing testimony on October 8, 1980, Judge Orfield again expressed his overriding

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6. This court makes no finding concerning whether petitioner may have staged the October 8 incident in order to delay the trial and/or create an appellate issue by getting himself reshackled. Whatever petitioner's motivation, this court finds only that the attack occurred at petitioner's instigation.

concern with the safety of the individuals working in the courtroom. Id. at 403.

31. Judge Orfield explicitly recognized "a pattern of increased agitation on the part of the defendant." Id. at 404. Further, Judge Orfield found that petitioner "has defied all authority and I think it is just a matter of time before he would begin to defy all authority here in the courtroom." Id.

32. In considering whether to reshackle petitioner after the attack on October 8, 1980, Judge Orfield also had "in mind" the prior attacks on Ryan and Robinson, III E.H. 14, as well as petitioner's threats to Robinson to disrupt the trial, id. at 15.

33. In addition, Judge Orfield considered petitioner's general demeanor in court, and found him to "be an angry individual." Id. at 16. Judge

Orfield was concerned that petitioner "was on the edge of losing control of himself at any time." Id.

34. As described above in Findings of Fact 17-18, the leg brace had already been rejected as a restraint option due to petitioner's claim of discomfort and the unavailability of any other type of brace. Judge Orfield also considered, and rejected, the possibility of counteracting petitioner's potential for violence by increasing the number of bailiffs around petitioner to three. Id. at 17. This alternative was rejected because Judge Orfield believed "that it would be just as bad for that to occur as to have him in shackles," and because Judge Orfield was concerned that additional bailiffs could not adequately control petitioner should he act out "in a very forceful and sudden manner." Id. at 17-18.

35. As a third alternative, Judge Orfield considering removing petitioner from the courtroom during trial, but this alternative was rejected as impossible due to petitioner's status as co-counsel. Id. at 19.

36. With no alternative available, and because of his extreme concern with the safety of court personnel, Judge Orfield ordered petitioner shackled for trial. 29 R.T. 404.

37. During the afternoon of Wednesday, October 8, 1980, jury selection resumed with petitioner in shackles. This was the first time petitioner appeared before any juror in shackles. As jury selection proceeded, Judge Orfield instructed each individual juror that he or she should draw no inference from the fact that the petitioner was shackled, and none of the

jurors expressed any prejudice towards petitioner as a result of the shackling. See e.g., 29 R.T. at 416, 432, 454. Petitioner participated in voir dire by questioning potential jurors directly. See e.g., 29 R.T. at 450.

38. After deciding that petitioner should be shackled, the court attempted to minimize the prejudicial effect of the shackling. The entire shackling mechanism worn by petitioner weighed approximately two pounds. X E.H. 107. Petitioner was always seated before the jury entered the courtroom, and the shackles were worn underneath his coat, as physically demonstrated during the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 101-02. However, because petitioner testified in his own defense, this Court finds that the jury was aware that petitioner was shackled.

39. The above findings of fact have been culled from the trial and evidentiary hearing transcripts. Upon review of said transcripts, and having made credibility determinations throughout the evidentiary hearing, this court concludes that said findings accurately describe the information available to Judge Orfield when he considered whether to shackle petitioner in front of the jury. In addition, and for the same reasons, this court concludes that the above findings accurately describe the factors and alternatives actually considered by Judge Orfield in deciding to shackle petitioner, as well as the prominence of the shackles from the jury's perspective.

B. Conclusions of Law

1. Although a criminal defendant generally has the right to appear before a jury free of shackles, the

trial court's decision to shackle a defendant is not per se unconstitutional. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1937 (1990). It is within the trial court's discretion to use shackles or other security measures "when circumstances dictate," Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985), although this "must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action." Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983). The habeas court must review the trial judge's decision to use shackles for an abuse of discretion. Spain, 883 F.2d 716.

2. The trial court must take two steps prior to shackling a defendant. Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 95 (1990). "First the court must be persuaded by compelling circumstances `that some measure was needed to maintain

the security of the courtroom.'" Id. at 885 (quoting Spain, 883 F.2d at 720). "Second, the court must `pursue less restrictive alternatives before imposing physical restraints.'" Jones, 899 F.2d at 885 (quoting Spain, 883 F.2d at 721).

3. To satisfy the second requirement, the trial court must first "assess the extent of the limitations that would be present if shackles were applied." Spain, 883 F.2d at 721. "These limitations include the following: (1) shackles may reverse the presumption of innocence by causing jury prejudice; (2) shackles may impair the defendant's mental faculties; (3) shackles may impede communication between the defendant and counsel; (4) shackles may detract from the decorum of the judicial proceeding; and (5) shackles may cause pain to the defendant." Jones, 899 F.2d at 885. "After considering these factors, the

trial judge 'must weigh the benefits and [these] burdens of shackling against other possible alternatives.'" Id. (quoting Spain, 883 F.2d at 721).

4. With respect to the first step prescribed in Spain, a number of factors, not just any single one, provided Judge Orfield with ample justification for implementing some type of security measure to protect courtroom personnel, defense counsel, and himself. Petitioner's attacks on Ryan and Robinson, combined with his outburst in jail on October 8, 1980, demonstrated petitioner's propensity towards violence and his inability to control himself.

5. Although these incidents occurred out of court, Judge Orfield also had every reason to believe that petitioner was likely to engage in violent activity in court, as evidenced by the following factors: (1) petitioner's

veiled threat during the in camera hearing on September 24, 1980; (2) Ryan's revelation on October 2, 1980, indicating to Judge Orfield that petitioner had stated to Robinson that he would disrupt the court proceedings by attacking counsel, the bailiff, or the judge himself; and (3) petitioner's general demeanor while before Judge Orfield. Because petitioner's propensity towards violence was well-documented, and because there was substantial evidence indicating that this propensity might be carried out in court, this court concludes that compelling circumstances existed which mandated the use of security measures.

6. In assessing the second step prescribed by Spain, the evidence indicates that Judge Orfield pursued alternatives prior to shackling defendant. In fact, Judge Orfield employed the leg brace alternative until petitioner's

complaints rendered the use of the brace impossible. Prior to shackling petitioner on October 8, 1980, Judge Orfield explored two other alternatives, but dismissed them as impracticable under the circumstances. With no other alternatives available, it is clear that the relative benefits and burdens of shackling petitioner mandated the decision eventually reached by Judge Orfield.

7. For these reasons, this court concludes that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order petitioner shackled under the circumstances.

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: SHACKLING REQUESTS

A. Findings of Fact

40. The court hereby incorporates by reference Findings of Fact 1-39 above. Although the above findings represent the information available to

Judge Orfield with respect to the shackling of defendant, they are also relevant to the circumstances surrounding Ryan's decision to request that petitioner be shackled on September 18 and 24, 1980. To the extent the above findings do not fully portray the circumstances surrounding Ryan's request with respect to Ryan's thought processes and the attorney-client relationship, they are supplemented below.

41. During the in camera hearings before Judge Gill on September 18, 1980, and Judge Orfield on September 24, 1980, neither Ryan nor Robinson gave a detailed account of the attack on Robinson. 21 R.T. 157, 162; 72 R.T. 3-4. However, the details of that attack were known to Ryan when he requested that petitioner be shackled, as Robinson had described the ferocity of the attack to him shortly after it occurred, at which

time she appeared terrified. V E.H. 107; VII E.H. 60. Robinson told Ryan that she had been forced to bite petitioner through the tongue. V E.H. 107. When Ryan asked petitioner about the incident, petitioner confirmed that he had attacked Robinson. V E.H. 109.

42. There is no credible evidence before the court indicating that this attack constituted anything less than a violent sexual assault. Robinson testified that when she attempted to leave the jail interview room after meeting with petitioner, petitioner blocked her path. VIII E.H. at 137. Petitioner grabbed Robinson, placed his hands around her neck, and began choking her. Id. at 137-40. Eventually, petitioner pinned Robinson's hands behind her back, and only when Robinson drew blood by biting petitioner's tongue did the attack cease. Id. at 140. Robinson characterized the

attack as "life-threatening." Id. at 149. The court finds Robinson's testimony to be credible and consistent with the type of attack that would have moved Ryan to approach Judge Gill with the shackling request.[7]

43. In addition to the physical assaults on Robinson and himself and the general threat of disruption, Ryan also considered, but did not reveal to the court, petitioner's ongoing threats "to get" particular witnesses, the bailiff, and the district attorney. V E.H. 126-29, 131, 135. Moreover, Ryan considered but did not reveal to the court,

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7. Petitioner's attempts to downplay this incident are totally unpersuasive and incredible. In light of Robinson's testimony, the characterization of this incident as an awkward romantic endeavor is repugnant and wholly unbelievable. See Petitioner's Post-Hearing Brief at 87 ("Her testimony that Petitioner's tongue was biten (sic) as he was advancing towards her with his tongue out of his mouth speaks eloquently of the amorous intent.").

petitioner's earlier episodes of violence, as related by his former wife, various girlfriends, and as suggested by a then pending robbery case in which petitioner had allegedly beaten an elderly woman. VI E.H. 144.

44. Against this backdrop of violent behavior and potential danger, Ryan requested that petitioner be shackled on September 18 and 24, 1980. When Ryan initially requested that petitioner be placed in restraints, he informed Judge Gill that his principal concern was the detriment that petitioner would suffer if he acted violently in front of the jury. 21 R.T. 159. In requesting that the shackles remain on petitioner during the in camera hearing before Judge Orfield on September 24, 1980, Ryan again reiterated his concern with the effect any violent outburst by petitioner might have on the jury. 72 R.T. 3, 4-5. Specifically, Ryan

"was concerned about Mr. Hamilton attacking somebody at the courtroom, acting out, attacking either in the presence of the jury or in the presence of somebody else who would testify to the attack at a penalty phase trial." V E.H. 133.

45. From the initial request through the evidentiary hearing, Ryan has never deviated from his position that shackles were necessary primarily to prevent petitioner from hurting his own cause before the jury. Based upon the trial record and a careful evaluation of Ryan's testimony during the evidentiary hearing, this court finds Ryan's position to be credible and truthful.

46. During the September 18, 1980 hearing, Ryan also alluded to his concern that petitioner's violent outbursts against Robinson and Ryan might later be used by petitioner to support a

collateral attack on Ryan's effectiveness, if Ryan did not reveal the incidents to the court. 21 R.T. 159-60; V E.H. 140.

47. During the hearings of September 18 and 24, 1980, Ryan never explicitly stated that his shackling request was motivated out of concern for his own safety or that his staff. However, his concern in his regard may be logically inferred from his comments, and this concern was certainly of substantial importance to Judge Orfield. 72 R.T. 8.

48. After the first request on September 18, 1980, Judge Gill asked Ryan whether he remained prepared to represent petitioner to the best of his ability. 21 R.T. 160. Noting that he had "given it a lot of thought," Ryan responded affirmatively, stating his belief that he could continue as lead counsel for the defense. Id. Ryan stated that he believed in petitioner's

innocence. Id. at 161. When the same question was put to Robinson by Judge Gill, she also responded affirmatively and stated that she too believed in petitioner's innocence. Id. at 162.

49. Ryan withdraw his shackling request on October 2, 1980, before petitioner ever appeared before the jury, and petitioner remained unshackled until October 8, 1980, when his jail outburst convinced Judge Orfield, over Ryan's objection, 29 R.T. 401, that petitioner should shackled during trial.

B. Conclusions of Law

8. In order to demonstrate unconstitutional ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must satisfy two elements:

> First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the

> defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 687 (1984).

Importantly, the Court has held that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and the reviewing court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . ." Id. at 689.

9. The sixth amendment guarantees every criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel who is unhindered by conflicting interests. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). "Although the issue of a conflict typically arises in a case involving joint representation, it also may arise when a client's interest conflicts with that of

his attorney. The same principles apply." United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987).

10. Where an alleged conflict of interest forms the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must demonstrate "that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). If petitioner makes this showing, then prejudice is presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.

11. In requesting that petitioner be shackled, Ryan was not actively representing conflicting interests. Ryan has stated, and this court has found, that Ryan's paramount concern was the potential for violent

conduct in front of the jury. Because such conduct would maximally prejudice petitioner before the jury, Ryan acted in petitioner's best interests in requesting that petitioner be shackled, particularly since the jury would be instructed to disregard the restraints. The fact that Ryan may have harbored lesser concerns, including the safety of his staff and the potential for collateral legal attacks by petitioner, does not change this result.

12. Moreover, Ryan's request did not adversely affect his performance. Ryan never wavered from his conviction that petitioner was innocent, and he explicitly informed Judge Gill that he was prepared to carry on as lead defense counsel. There has been no showing by petitioner that Ryan's performance suffered because of his initial desire to have petitioner shackled.

13. Alternatively, even if the initial shackling request did constitute a conflict of interest between Ryan and petitioner, this court concludes that Ryan was ethically required as an officer of the court to act as he did under these circumstances. See ABA Code of Prof. Responsibility, DR 4-101(C)(3) (permitting an attorney to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime"); ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (attorney may reveal confidential information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act . . . likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm"). By informing the court of the situation and requesting that petitioner be shackled, Ryan was merely refusing to be a silent partner in any future violent outbursts. Because Ryan indicated that he

was able to continue to represent petitioner after he had fulfilled his ethical duty, the court was entitled to allow Ryan to continue as counsel. To hold otherwise would merely encourage counsel to shirk his or her ethical duties in order to avoid any subsequent conflict of interest charges.

14. For these reasons, the court concludes that petitioner has not met the standard articulated in Strickland for ineffective assistance of counsel claims based upon an alleged conflict of interest.

IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL PERFORMANCE

A. Decapitation

(a) Findings of Fact

50. During petitioner's trial, Dr. Frances Luibel, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on the body of Eleanore Buchanan, testified that he was

unable to state with certainty whether the victim's head and hands were removed ante-mortem or post-mortem. 42 R.T. 2337. However, Dr. Luibel did state his opinion that the victim was "probably dead" when her hands were cut off. Id. Moreover, Dr. Luibel had expressed his opinion to Ryan in a pre-trial interview that decapitation occurred post-mortem, VI E.H. 157, and an investigative report prepared by Detective Cellucci also indicated that Dr. Luibel at least initially believed that decapitation occurred post-mortem, Petitioner's Exh. 23, p. 5.

51. During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Luibel again testified that while he believed that decapitation occurred post-mortem, he was unable to render this conclusion "with 100 percent certainty." I E.H. 68. Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Hormoz Guard, testified that in his opinion decapitation

occurred post-mortem. Id. at 47. Dr. Guard did not qualify his opinion or otherwise express any uncertainty as to its validity. Id. at 59.

52. Respondents concede that Ryan neither argued post-mortem decapitation to the jury, nor attempted to prevent the prosecutor from arguing that decapitation may have occurred while the victim was alive.

(b) Conclusions of Law

15. Petitioner has not met his burden under either prong of Strickland with respect to the decapitation issue. Because Dr. Luibel, who performed the autopsy, has never been able to testify to a certainty that decapitation occurred post-mortem, it would have been impossible for Ryan to prevent the prosecutor from arguing that decapitation might have occurred ante-mortem, even if Ryan obtained and

introduced expert testimony consistent with that offered by Dr. Guard. A prosecutor may argue any inference which is supported by the evidence. See e.g., People v. Beivelman, 70 Cal.2d 60, 76-77 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. California, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).

16. Moreover, Ryan's decision not to press the decapitation issue in the defense case cannot be characterized as professionally unreasonable. Whether the victim was decapitated before or after death, the jury was confronted by a particularly gruesome crime. For Ryan to introduce evidence and/or argument concerning when the victim was decapitated might strike a reasonable juror as an effort to trivialize the heinous nature of the crime. Instead of benefitting petitioner, such argument might have prejudiced the jury against him. Therefore, petitioner

has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice in Ryan's treatment of the decapitation issue.

B. Blood on the Shoe

(a) Findings of Fact

53. The prosecution introduced into evidence petitioner's blood-stained shoe. Trial Exh. 24. Analysis of the blood smear on the shoe revealed that it matched the victim's blood type, and was different than petitioner's blood type. 51 R.T. 3112, 3114. The shoe and its blood stain constituted one of the prosecution's many important pieces of evidence. X E.H. 88.

54. During trial, the defense attempted to introduce a theory suggesting that the shoe might have been smeared with the victim's blood through contact with the van's blood stained carpet, as opposed to contact with the victim herself. 59 R.T. 3906. The

defense expert criminalist, V. Parker Bell, testified that the blood could have been transferred to shoe from the carpet. Id. However, Bell conceded on cross-examination that there were no blue fibers from the carpet present in the blood on the shoe. Id. On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled criminalist Brandon Armstrong, who also testified that the blood on the shoe contained no blue fibers. 60 R.T. 4017. Moreover, Armstrong testified "that if the shoe had rubbed onto a stained bloody carpet that was -- had that loose of a nap, . . . the fibers would have stuck to the shoe in the blood or would have been mixed in with the blood deposited on the shoe." Id. at 4018.

55. During the evidentiary hearing, Bell testified that he was never asked by Ryan to test whether the shoe could have been stained by coming into

contact with blood from the carpet. V E.H. 34-35. Bell proceeded to describe a test he performed at the request of petitioner's present counsel, in which he applied blood soaked carpet samples to a shoe in an attempt to determine whether fibers would necessarily be transferred to the shoe. Id. at 35-37. Based upon his experiment, Bell concluded that "it would be possible that the blood could have been applied to the shoe by coming in contact with the bloody carpet, without a transfer of carpet fibers." Id. at 38.

56. Bell's experiment was flawed in numerous respects. First, the carpeting used was not from the victim's van, but was carpet that Bell determined to be similar by "look and feel." V E.H. 56. Bell conceded that the samples he used "were somewhat different from the carpet in the van." Id. at 36. Moreover, the shoes used by Bell were different than

petitioner's blood-stained shoe. 9 R.T. 127. Finally, the blood used in the Bell experiment came from the blood bank and had been treated with anticoagulants, so that its clotting capability, consistency, drying time, and tackiness were all different than that of the fresh blood which stained petitioner's shoe. 9 R.T. 126-27.

57. During the evidentiary hearing, Armstrong testified that he remained of the opinion that the stain on the shoe did not come from the rug. II E.H. 22-23. Armstrong observed that "[t]he body, the clothing, virtually everything that came out of the van had fibers on it if it had been in contact with the carpet . . . ." Id. at 23. Armstrong further testified that Bell's recent experiment did not change his opinion in any way. IX E.H. 131.

58. The court finds that the net effect of the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing is no different than that produced at trial, even taking into account Bell's new experiment. This court finds that Bell's test is of no persuasive value, and even its admissibility is extremely doubtful.

(b) Conclusions of Law

17. Petitioner has not met his burden under either prong of Strickland with respect to the blood on the shoe. The court concludes that competent counsel would not be required to conduct further tests with respect to the source of the blood, if he had already secured an expert opinion supporting the theory that the blood could have come from the carpet, as Ryan had done.

18. Moreover, even had Ryan investigated and argued the issue in the manner now urged by petitioner, there

has been no showing whatsoever that the jury would not have chosen to believe that the blood was transferred to the shoe through direct contact with the victim. Therefore, petitioner has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice in Ryan's investigation of the blood on the shoe.

C. Transportation of the Victim's Body

(a) Findings of Fact

59. During trial, the prosecution argued that the victim's body was transported to Pine Valley by petitioner in the victim's van, where it was dumped by petitioner. 63 R.T. 4150-51. Specifically, the prosecution posited that the victim's body was transported in the back of the van, in the storage compartment under the rear seat. Id. This contention was supported by the location of a major blood stain in the

storage compartment, and the presence of blue carpet fibers on the victim's stomach and arm stumps. Id.

60. In response to this argument, Ryan vigorously argued that the body was not transported to Pine Valley in the van, but rather transported in another car driven by the true killer. Id. at 4210-11. Noting that there was no dispute that the body was transported after rigor mortis had set in, Ryan suggested that the body could not have been transported in the position in which it was eventually discovered. Id. at 4210. Moreover, Ryan noted the absence of blood anywhere else in the van. Id. at 4211. Finally, Ryan emphasized the presence of other tire tracks in the remote area where the body was dumped, which he opined "were left by the vehicle that dropped that body there." Id. Ryan concluded "that the body was not taken out there in that van." Id.

61. During the evidentiary hearing, petitioner attempted to demonstrate that the body could not have been transported in the manner theorized by the prosecution. Petitioner's criminalist Bell testified that it was unlikely, although not impossible, that the body could have been transported in the storage compartment, given the location of the spare tire in that compartment at the time of petitioner's arrest. V E.H. 45. However, Bell conceded on cross-examination that the spare tire was not secured in the storage compartment, but could be moved freely. Id. at 60.

62. Respondents submitted evidence indicating that the body could have been transported by petitioner in the storage compartment. Specifically, respondents presented photographs of a female agent positioned in the storage

compartment. IX E.H. 138-45; Exh. A-25. However, the positioning of the agent for the photographs did not take into account the location of the blood stain, the location of the spare tire, and the position of the victim. IX E.H. at 147-49.

63. Based upon the foregoing evidence, the court finds that the victim could have been transported in the van in the manner argued by the prosecution. On the other hand, competent defense counsel could argue that the evidence does not support the prosecution's theory, as Ryan did. The court finds that the additional evidence proffered at the evidentiary hearing did not resolve the issue and would only marginally have affected the ability of either side to make their respective arguments.

(b) Conclusions of Law

19. Petitioner has not met his burden under either prong of Strickland with respect to the transportation of the victim's body. Ryan's argument in response to the prosecution's theory on this issue constituted effective assistance of counsel. Moreover, there has been no showing by petitioner that any additional investigation of this issue would have significantly advanced the credibility of Ryan's argument in this regard, given the state of the evidence.

20. In addition, petitioner has made no showing of prejudice, given the evidence amassed against him on this issue and many others. As demonstrated at the evidentiary hearing, even with additional investigation Ryan could not have stopped the prosecution from arguing persuasively

that the body was transported to Pine Valley in the van. Therefore, petitioner has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice in Ryan's treatment of this issue.

D. Petitioner's Identification of the Victim

(a) Findings of Fact

64. Upon petitioner's arrest in Oklahoma in possession of the victim's van, San Diego Sheriff's detectives Norman Crawford and Joe Cellucci travelled to Oklahoma to interview petitioner concerning the murder. 49 R.T. 2841. Petitioner explained to Detective Crawford that he came into possession of the van lawfully after travelling with the victim and a man named Calvin Spencer (aka "Spider"). Id. at 2862. According to petitioner's story at the time, the victim and Spider let him take the van and the victim's credit cards

in Shreveport, Louisiana, because they had business to conduct and petitioner did not want to stay in Shreveport. Id. at 2857-58, 2880-81. Petitioner claimed that the victim and Spider had agreed to contact him at his cousin's home in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the very next day. Id. at 2858, 2862. In other words, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any homicide and told Detective Crawford that the victim was alive and well. Id. at 2869-70.

65. In order to lend credibility to this version of events, petitioner positively identified the victim, his purported travelling companion, from a photograph offered by Detective Crawford. Id. at 2873. In addition, petitioner consistently referred to the victim as "Fran," which was her true nickname. Id. at 2871-2873, 2873. Finally, petitioner stated that "Fran" was wearing light colored jeans and carrying a

beige purse when petitioner was supposedly travelling with her and Spider. Id. at 2875-76. In fact, when the victim left her home on the night she was murdered, she was wearing tan jeans and carrying a tan purse. 41 R.T. 2151.

66. The evidence indicates that petitioner abandoned the "Spider" story sometime after the victim's headless and handless body was positively identified as Eleanor "Fran" Buchanan. Petitioner claims that he concocted the "Spider" theory in order to avoid being charged with the simple theft of the van. 54 R.T. 3481. Since abandoning the Spider story, petitioner has steadfastly claimed, throughout trial and this proceeding, that he stole the abandoned van but has never seen the victim alive or dead.

67. Petitioner's revision of his story necessarily brought into question his ability to identify the

victim, refer to her by her nickname, and describe her purse and pants during the interview with Detective Crawford. During trial, Ryan argued that petitioner "knew [the victim] through the purse that was in the van and the information that was contained therein," 54 R.T. 3393, and the jury received evidence supporting that theory. See e.g., 41 R.T. 2116-17. However, Ryan never put into evidence any plausible explanation for petitioner's ability to describe accurately the style and color of the victim's pants.

68. During his closing argument at trial, the prosecutor attacked petitioner's contention that he had never seen the victim, observing that petitioner identified the victim to Detective Crawford, as well as the style and color of her pants. 63 R.T. 4151-53. Ryan did not attempt to rebut this specific argument in his closing.

69. During the evidentiary hearing, petitioner stated that he was able to identify the victim because there were photographs of her in the tan purse that he found in the van, as well as papers indicating that the owner of the van was named "Fran." II E.H. 46-47. Petitioner further stated that he "came up with the idea of light pants because her purse was light." Id. at 46. Petitioner explained that he cannot be held accountable for the "coincidence" that the victim was in fact wearing light pants on the day she was murdered. Id. at 148.

70. Based upon the trial and evidentiary hearing transcripts, as well as this court's evaluation of petitioner's testimony, the court finds that petitioner's theory with respect to his knowledge of the victim's pants is wholly incredible. Petitioner's claim that he guessed the style and color of

pants from the color of the purse is unworthy of belief, and would not have had any beneficial impact on the jury. The court infers that Ryan did not present petitioner's theory to the jury because it was unbelievable and would have caused petitioner further prejudice by emphasizing the strength of the government's case in this regard.

(b) Conclusions of Law

21. Petitioner has not met his burden under either prong of Strickland with respect to his identification of the victim. The court concludes that Ryan acted competently when confronted by an extremely difficult situation. Although Ryan may not have fully responded to the prosecutor's closing argument on this issue, the evidence supporting the defense theory of identification was submitted to the jury. With respect to the discrete issue of the

pants, Ryan's failure to present a completely incredible story to the jury was a reasoned tactical decision and does not constitute deficient performance.

22. Moreover, even had Ryan adopted the strategy now urged by petitioner, there has been absolutely no showing of prejudice. On this issue the prosecution's case was extremely strong, and the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing would not have weakened the government's case in any respect. In other words, even after eleven years and with the benefit of hindsight, petitioner's present counsel have fared no better in mitigating the impact of petitioner's statements to Detective Crawford. Quite simply, it is doubtful even a miracle worker could have done so, and Stickland does not require defense counsel to be miracle workers. Therefore, petitioner has demonstrated

neither deficient performance nor prejudice in Ryan's argument concerning the identification of the victim.

E. Cumulative Impact of the Alleged Deficiencies

(a) Findings of Fact

71. Judge Orfield stated that the evidence of guilt in this case was "overwhelming," even though it was based upon circumstantial evidence. III E.H. 23. In addition, Judge Orfield opined that "Mr. Ryan did an excellent job in a most difficult case with a very, very difficult client." Id. at 21; see also 66 R.T. 4320 (statement to same effect by Judge Orfield at conclusion of guilt phase of trial, noting that "[i]t is almost as if Mr. Hamilton were attempting to sabotage his case.").

72. Moreover, the prosecutor in the case, Thomas McCardle, testified during the evidentiary hearing

that Ryan did "an amazing job in a case which seemed to me to be impossible for any defense attorney to win." IX E.H. 158. McCardle noted that Ryan was "hobbled greatly by the defendant's inability to keep his mouth shut, and the defendant's inability to refrain from taking positions in writing under oath and sometimes not under oath that put Mr. Ryan in an extremely difficult position." Id. at 159.

73. Based upon its own independent review of all of the evidence, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of petitioner's expert witness, this court agrees with the conclusions reached by Judge Orfield and McCardle. The evidence amassed against petitioner was overwhelming. Reasonably interpreted, the evidence could only have supported a guilty verdict. Moveover, petitioner's own statements and letters contributed

substantially to his guilt, and persistently frustrated the efforts of Ryan to present the defense case.

(b) Conclusions of Law

23. This court has explicitly concluded that petitioner has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to any of the individual attacks on Ryan's performance. Therefore, it is obvious that the cumulative impact on these non-deficiencies cannot constitute ineffective assistance under Stickland.

24. However, even if one or more of petitioner's challenges to Ryan's performance were viable, petitioner has still not demonstrated prejudice on a cumulative level. In other words, the strength of the prosecution's case is such that petitioner's tactical challenges, guided by hindsight, do not undermine this

court's confidence in the outcome of the trial.

25. Moreover, Ryan's decision not to argue lingering doubt at the penalty phase does not indicate incompetence, where the evidence arrayed against petitioner was so overwhelming that counsel could reasonably have concluded that the jury could not be persuaded to recognize any lingering doubt. Under these circumstances, reasonable counsel might choose tactically to emphasize other avenues in his or her mitigation strategy, as Ryan did here.

26. The law rightfully does not recognize the concept of ineffective assistance by the criminal defendant himself. Instead, the law is generally willing to allow a criminal defendant to aid the prosecution's case, whether such aid be rendered purposefully or inadvertently. Here, petitioner

rendered such aid consistently and to the prosecution's ultimate reward. Viewed in this light, petitioner's current attempts to challenge counsel's performance ring hollow, and reflect petitioner's persistent belief that he can blame others for those troubles which he brings upon himself. This court is not impressed by these attempts, and concludes with unequivocal certainty that petitioner received assistance of counsel that went far beyond the level guaranteed by the Constitution.

V. DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S ALLEGED REQUESTS FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION

A. Findings of Fact

74. After waiving extradition from Oklahoma, petitioner was arraigned in San Diego and Patrick O'Connor was appointed to represent him. At the time of the arraignment, O'Connor was already representing petitioner on a

pending robbery charge. On Wednesday, June 27, 1979, during the preliminary hearing before Judge Stahl, petitioner requested that O'Connor be relieved, stating, "I feel I'm being wrongly advised and there are several other personal things involved . . . . [H]e is doing an inadequate job as far as defending me at the best than he has (sic)." 2 P.H.T. 216-17. Judge Stahl denied petitioner's motion, observing that O'Connor "knows best how to conduct this matter, Mr. Hamilton, and from all I have seen, he is the best qualified by far of any attorney to represent you at this hearing." Id. at 217.

75. On Friday, September 14, 1979, during pre-trial motions before Judge Maas, petitioner requested again that O'Connor be removed from the case. 5 R.T. 1. The prosecutor, noting that "[w]e have heard this business from Mr. Hamilton

before," objected to hearing the motion without any prior notice and without an opportunity to brief the issue. Id. at 2-3. In considering whether to hear petitioner's request, the court recognized the potential for delay and, more importantly, the ability of a defendant to create delay through such motions: "Because as an obstructionist tactic, a defendant can raise this all the time, with no notice, and witnesses come here and expect to present their evidence, and go on." Id. at 3. Nevertheless, over the prosecutor's objection, Judge Maas continued the pre-trial motions so that the motion to relieve counsel could be heard by the presiding judge, Judge Gilliam. Id. at 4. In so ruling, Judge Maas stated, "I consider this an obstructionist tactic by Mr. Hamilton, but he has a right to have this issue raised,

and litigated, and disposed of." Id. at 5.

76. On Wednesday, September 19, 1979, before Judge Gilliam, petitioner's request was heard and considered. In requesting specific grounds for petitioner's motion, the court noted that O'Connor is "one of the better lawyers," and "has done everything timely, and he's interested in the case . . . ." VII R.T. 10. In objecting to the motion, the prosecutor stated, "it is clear that one of the effects of the defendant's motion will be to get another continuance of the trial date." Id. at 19.

77. During the hearing on September 19, petitioner claimed that he had lost trust in O'Connor as a result of O'Connor's failure to do everything demanded by petitioner during the preliminary hearing and the continuing defense investigation. Id. at 23-28.

Moreover, petitioner bemoaned O'Connor's inability or unwillingness to cure problems being experienced by petitioner due to his incarceration. Id. 28-30. After hearing the above complaints about O'Connor, Judge Gilliam indicated that he was inclined to deny the motion, as he was "confident that [O'Connor] will be as fair and as straight a shooter as you can get." Id. at 31.

78. However, after stating his complaints regarding O'Connor's performance, petitioner claimed that he was told by an employee of the Public Defender who "works under Mr. O'Connor" that petitioner may be advised to enter a plea of insanity. Id. at 32. Petitioner claimed that the employee was an investigator whom he had known since childhood, who also told him that he had better "watch" O'Connor. Id. at 32-33. Upon the court's request, petitioner

identified the employee as Doug Hendrix. Id.

79. Apparently accepting petitioner's story as true, and without further inquiry at this time, Judge Gilliam stated that a "breach of faith" had occurred. Id. at 34.[8] Accordingly, O'Connor was relieved and the court ruled that his replacement would have to come from outside of the public Defender's Office. VII R.T. 34. Judge Gilliam explicitly stated that O'Connor was not being relieved because of anything he had done or failed to do in the case, notwithstanding petitioner's performance related complaints. Id. at 37.

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8. When Judge Gilliam conducted a subsequent hearing to investigate the matter, considerable doubt was cast upon petitioner's allegations. Hendrix testified, "It's my opinion that Bernie fabricated everything he said in this courtroom today just so he can get a new lawyer. I tried my best to help him." 9 R.T. 47.

80. On Friday, September 21, 1979, Jerome Wallingford appeared before Judge Gilliam and stated that he had been contacted by the Public Defender in connection with taking over the defense of petitioner. 8 R.T. 42. Wallingford and petitioner had met "for a couple of hours" the day before, and petitioner stated to the court his willingness to have Wallingford represent him. Id. The court stated, "You have a good lawyer." Id. Wallingford was formally appointed later that day, again with petitioner's approval. 9 R.T. 43.

81. On Wednesday, November 7 and Friday, November 9, 1979, petitioner moved to have Wallingford removed and another attorney appointed. 11 R.T. 55, 59. After hearing extensively from petitioner in camera, Judge Gilliam stated, "I've been through all the reasons with you, and I can't see that you have

any reasonable grounds to remove Mr. Wallingford." 76 R.T. 29. At the conclusion of the hearing on November 9, 1980, Judge Gilliam nevertheless agreed to have another attorney appointed to assist Wallingford. Id. at 29. Petitioner apparently renewed his motion to have Wallingford relieved on Tuesday, November 20, and Wallingford did not object, stating, "I just don't think I can work with Mr. Hamilton, and I think he agrees at this point. . . . I feel like I have tried everything I can to try to work with him and at this point I just don't believe it would be fair to Mr. Hamilton to leave me on the case." Id. at 63.

92. On Monday, November 26, 1979, Ryan was formally appointed to represent petitioner, and Wallingford was relieved. 12 R.T. 4. Upon appointing Ryan, Judge Gilliam stated:

> Mr. Hamilton, I don't know that I'm going to talk to you any

> more about change of lawyers because we've been through two very, very competent lawyers and now three. Now you are working with Mr. Ryan, and he is also a competent lawyer. And the filibuster has got to stop. We're going to trial on this case.

Id. at 13. This court finds that Judge Gilliam's statement reflects the general belief of the trial court that petitioner was attempting to inject delay and uncertainty into the proceedings by constantly requesting that counsel be removed. This court finds said belief to be entirely correct inasmuch as petitioner's irrational and perpetual dissatisfaction with counsel can only be explained by his desire to manipulate the system.

83. Based upon the proceedings through November 26, 1979, when Ryan was appointed, this court finds that petitioner engaged in a pattern of activity that was not motivated by good

faith disputes over defense strategy, but rather was designed solely to manufacture potential error and cause delay. Most importantly, it is this context in which petitioner's subsequent motions to represent himself must be viewed.

84. On Monday, April 21, 1980, before Judge Gill, petitioner moved to have Ryan removed from the case. 17 R.T. 5. Petitioner charged Ryan and co-counsel Camberg with failing to raise certain issues which he deemed important, and stated that he could no longer trust them. Id at 6-13. Ryan responded that he believed that he could continue to represent petitioner to the best of his ability. Id. at 20. Louis Katz, Director of Defender Services for the county, reviewed in detail petitioner's history of dissatisfaction with his appointed attorneys, and concluded, "I know Mr. Ryan has done a very complete and competent job

in this area. I think, your Honor, it's just Mr. Hamilton is never going to be satisfied with whoever he gets." Id. at 22.

85. The prosecution opposed petitioner's request to have Ryan and Camberg removed, noting that the current trial date was already thirteen months removed from the date of the murder. Id. at 26. Notwithstanding the prosecution's desire to have the matter come to trial, petitioner stated, "And as far as time is concerned, I'm not worried about the time it takes." Id. at 28.

86. After hearing from all parties, Judge Gill found that Ryan and Camberg "have been working very diligently in Mr. Hamilton's behalf," and that Ryan "is well qualified by experience, competent training, background, to handle a case of this magnitude." Id. at 30.

Accordingly, Judge Gill denied the motion to relieve counsel. Id.

87. Upon Judge Gill's denial of the motion, petitioner stated, "I request to represent myself then. I might as well." Id. Judge Gill responded that the motion was not presently before the court, but could be raised at a later time. Id. at 30-31. The court then recessed for the day. Id. at 31. This is the first "request" relied upon by petitioner before this court, and is hereinafter referred to a "Request 1."

88. On Friday, April 25, 1980, before Judge Gill, petitioner renewed his motion to have Ryan relieved, and Ryan himself moved to be relieved, observing that since the hearing on April 21 petitioner had completely refused to speak to him. 18 R.T. 33. The court denied Ryan's motion for the same grounds upon which petitioner's motion was denied

on April 21. Id. at 34. After hearing extensively from petitioner, the court continued the hearing on petitioner's motion until April 28, 1980. Id. at 71.

89. On Monday, April 28, 1980, petitioner was again permitted by Judge Gill to discuss extensively his reasons for wanting Ryan and Camberg removed. Id. at 74-96. Primarily, petitioner bemoaned the fact that Ryan would not investigate petitioner's belief that Harry Piper, who discovered the victim's body, was the true killer. Id. at 74-75, 84. Petitioner attributed the failure of Ryan and Camberg to pursue the Piper theory to racial prejudice on their part. Id. at 96.

90. After explaining his reasons for wanting Ryan and Camberg removed, petitioner stated, "And if they're not going to defend me, I'd be better off making a fool of myself on my

own in front of -- ", at which point petitioner was interrupted by the court. Id. Petitioner did not pursue this expression of opinion further. This is the second "request" relied upon by petitioner before this court, and is hereinafter referred to as "Request 2."

91. After hearing from Ryan, and then hearing further from petitioner, Judge Gill denied petitioner's motion to relieve Ryan and Camberg. Id. at 111. The court stated that petitioner had presented no substantial basis supporting the motion to relieve Ryan and Camberg. Id. Petitioner immediately proceeded to ask Judge Gill about his pending request for telephone call privileges, and did not in any manner reiterate or otherwise allude to a desire to represent himself. Id. at 112.

92. On Friday, May 9, 1980, petitioner filed a handwritten

motion to relieve counsel and to represent himself. Id. at 114. However, before that motion could be heard, petitioner withdrew it and indicated that he instead wished to be designated co-counsel with Ryan and Camberg. Id. at 114. On Tuesday, May 13, 1980, Judge Gill granted petitioner's motion to be designated as co-counsel on the case with Ryan and Camberg. Id. at 135. The record suggests that this motion was granted in order to appease petitioner with respect to his role in the defense. Id. at 123-24.

93. On Tuesday, May 20, 1980, during pre-trial motions pursuant to Penal Code §§ 995 and 1538.5, Ryan advised Judge Maas that petitioner wished to renew his motion to represent himself. 19 R.T. 428. Ryan stated that "[petitioner] has told me that if, unless we proceed his way, he wants to be his own -- he wants me relived, he wants to represent himself."

Id. at 434. Petitioner stated his request in the alternative: "My request is to have Miss Camberg and Mr. Ryan relieved as counsel. In the event that is not granted, I would seek to renew my motion to proceed in pro per." Id. at 435. This is the third request relied upon by petitioner before this court, and is hereinafter referred to as "Request 3."

94. The prosecution again raised the prospect of delay, noting that every time the parties attempted to resolve pre-trial matters, "Mr. Hamilton has raised these issues with respect to representation . . . ." Id. at 439. The prosecutor stated, "But we can't stop the court processes every time Mr. Hamilton raises this issue of representation, because we will never get this damn thing done." Id. at 440.

95. After hearing from all parties on May 20, 1980, Judge Maas denied the alternative motion, finding:

> Mr. Hamilton has not stated a valid reason why Mr. Ryan should not represent him, and specifically the Court finds that for all intents and purposes Mr. Hamilton does not have a legitimate objection, but is only grasping at anything he can think of to delay the proceedings and I so find as to the 995 motion, and I will not relieve Mr. Ryan nor will I allow you to represent yourself in the matter. I find that you are not competent to represent yourself in the 995 because I do not believe that you understand the legal principles involved, the issues involved, or are able to fairly and adequately represent yourself.

Id. at 450 (emphasis supplied).

96. On June 11, 1980, Ryan moved to continue the trial, which was then set for June 23, 1980, so that the parties could await the result of a case then pending before the California Supreme Court, People v. Hovey, as that decision was considered relevant to the

proceedings. 20 R.T. 1. The court granted the motion, and set a new trial date of August 12, 1980. Id. at 5. On July 30, 1980, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the trial from August 12, 1980 to September 10, 1980. 21 R.T. 138. The California Supreme Court issued its decision on August 28, 1980. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.3d 1 (1980), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).[9/]

97. Subsequent to the court's denial on May 20, 1980, and prior

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9. The California Supreme Court's decision in Hovey required "that in future capital cases that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals with issues which involve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration." Hovey, 28 Cal.3d at 80. In so ruling, the court expressed its concern that the court's dismissal of those venirepersons who express unequivocal opposition to the death penalty "is likely to be interpreted by the remaining jurors as an indication that the judge in particular and the law in general disapprove of such attitudes." Id. at 74. Insofar as Hovey sought to eliminate this process, the decision benefitted petitioner.

to empanelment of the jury, petitioner submitted additional motions seeking to represent himself that he later withdrew, see 21 R.T. 150; 22 R.T. 4; 29 R.T. 410; 34 R.T. 1090, and one motion to represent himself that was heard in camera on the first morning of trial, after the jury had been empaneled, which was denied, 40 R.T. 2008-14. In addition, during trial petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking the denial of his request to represent himself, and requested a continuance. 47 R.T. 2694. This petition was denied for a number of reasons, including the court's concern with further delay and petitioner's inability to mount a defense on his own. Id. at 2712-14. These motions further reflect the persistence with which petitioner sought to delay the trial.

98. During the evidentiary hearing, Judge Orfield testified that

petitioner never made an unequivocal request for self-representation. III E.H. 9. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Orfield cited the "ambivalence" on petitioner's part in making the requests. III E.H. 9-10.

99. Petitioner's own expert witness, Howard Gillingham, after reviewing letters written by petitioner to Robinson and Ryan, testified before this court that petitioner "goes back and forth, quite frankly, on the pro per action and seems to use that as part of his frustration -- venting his frustration to get control of his case in some way, of his own destiny." IV E.H. 26.

100. Ryan testified before this court that he does not believe that petitioner "was ever sincere in wanting to represent himself." VI E.H. 38. In support of this conclusion, Ryan stated, "I believe he knew how to do it but was

trying to make a record that would appear that he was trying to go pro per but he would not go that last step that was needed to do so." Id. at 38. In fact, Ryan advised petitioner how to move to proceed in propria persona, and provided him with the relevant legal authority, although petitioner never relied on it. Id. at 36-37.

101. Robinson testified before this court that each time petitioner filed a motion to relieve counsel, Ryan "would come down to the jail and he would say, `Bernard, do you really want me off this case? If you really want me off this case, I will leave.' And Bernard would say `No.'" VIII E.H. 134. In addition, petitioner reiterated to Robinson privately his desire to have Ryan stay on the case, despite the pendency of the motions to relieve. Id. Robinson noted that petitioner "was bent on

stopping the trial." Id. at 149. According to Robinson, "he was just very afraid of proceeding to trial and that was his way of acting out. He definitely had informed me that he did not want to have Mr. Ryan relieved." IX E.H. 142.

102. Based on the testimony received at the evidentiary hearing and the state court transcripts, this court finds the testimony offered by Judge Orfield, Ryan, and Robinson credible and entirely consistent with the events documented in the state court transcripts. Specifically, petitioner's persistent attempts to relieve capable counsel suggest a desire to delay the trial, and this inference is supported and confirmed by the above referenced testimony.

B. Conclusions of Law

27. A criminal defendant in a state court trial has an absolute right to be represented by counsel or to

represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). The assertion of the right to self-representation must be knowing and intelligent, id. at 835, timely and not for the purpose of delay, United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), and unequivocal, Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986).

28. Before a defendant's decision to waive counsel will be knowing and intelligent, he "must be aware of the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . ." United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987).

29. A Faretta request is timely if it is asserted "before the jury is empaneled, unless it is made for the

purpose of delay." Smith, 780 F.2d at 811 (citations omitted).

30. The requirement that the request be unequivocal serves two purposes. Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). "First, it acts as a backstop for the defendant's right to counsel, by ensuring that the defendant does not inadvertently waive that right through occasional musings on the benefits of self representation." Id.; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (courts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel).

31. Second, the requirement that the request be unequivocal serves an institutional purpose by preventing the manipulative defendant from creating error as a result "of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-representation."

Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444. In other words, where a defendant vacillates, the trial court might be placed in a difficult position: "If the court appoints counsel, the defendant could, on appeal, rely on his intermittent requests for self-representation in arguing that he had been denied the right to represent himself; if the court permits self-representation, the defendant could claim he had been denied the right to counsel." Id. As the court stated in Carroll, "the requirement of unequivocality resolves this dilemma by forcing the defendant to make an explicit choice. If he equivocates, he is presumed to have requested the assistance of counsel." Id.

32. However, a Faretta request is not considered equivocal merely because it is conditional on the court's denial of a motion to substitute counsel,

provided that there is no evidence of vacillation. Id. at 1445.

33. Petitioner would have this court view his purported Faretta requests in a vacuum, without reference to his continuous motions to relieve competent counsel and the corresponding inference that petitioner was only interested in delaying the trial. In other words, petitioner argues only from the specific statements made on April 21 (Request 1), April 28 (Request 2), and May 20 (Request 3), and concludes that those statements, standing alone, constitute unequivocal requests to represent himself. However, it is clear that any inquiry into delay and equivocality requires that the requests be viewed in the larger context of petitioner's ongoing attempts to relieve counsel and the motivations which may reasonably be ascribed to those

attempts, based on the totality of the circumstances and the supporting evidence.

34. The court is satisfied that petitioner's purported requests were knowing and intelligent insofar as he recognized the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties, and the dangers inherent in representing himself.

35. The court is likewise satisfied that each purported request was timely insofar as it was asserted prior to empanelment of the jury.

36. However, the court concludes that each request made by petitioner was made for the purpose of delay. Based upon petitioner's perpetual dissatisfaction with counsel, the lack of any reasonable explanation for that dissatisfaction, and the evidence received by the court through the state court transcripts and the evidentiary hearing,

the court concludes that petitioner's request to proceed pro se were made for the sole purpose of delaying the trial date.

37. It is important to note that the court does not reach this conclusion as a result only of petitioner's perpetual dissatisfaction. This fact, standing alone, might not support the conclusion being drawn here. Instead, the court renders its decision because of the circumstances surrounding petitioner's repeated requests for new counsel and/or to represent himself, as well as the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing. When the issue is placed in the proper context and all of the available evidence is considered, the court is left with the inescapable conclusion that petitioner was using every tactic available to him to create delay.

38. Petitioner argues that his requests could not have been made for the purpose of delay because the parties had stipulated to a continuance of the trial date in order to await the Hovey decision. See Petitioner's Brief, p. 90. This contention is wholly without merit. The motion to continue the trial in order to await the Hovey decision was not made until June 11, 1980, and the stipulation continuing the trial date for that reason was not accepted by the court until July 30, 1980. See supra Finding of Fact 96. However, the purported Faretta requests were made on April 21, April 28, and May 20, 1980, when the trial date was set for June 23, 1980. Therefore, the subsequent continuance has no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner was seeking to delay the trial by virtue of his requests.

39. Because the court concludes that each of the three disputed

Faretta motions were made for the purpose of delay, the motions were properly denied.

40. Alternatively, the court concludes that each request was made equivocally. Request 1 and Request 2 were both statements in which petitioner did not manifest a true desire to represent himself, but merely frustration with the process and the denial of his request to substitute counsel. See supra Finding of Fact 87 ("I might as well."); Finding of Fact 90 ("I'd be better off making a fool of myself on my own . . . ."). Because Request 1 and Request 2 were accompanied by these self-defeatist pronouncements, they cannot be considered unequivocal. Rather, each request was plainly "a momentary caprice or the result of thinking out loud." Carroll, 875 F.2d at 1445. Because the court must indulge in every reasonable presumption against

waiver of the right to counsel, Request 1 and Request 2 must be considered equivocal.

41. With respect to Request 3, the court recognizes that it was stated more firmly. See supra Finding of Fact 93. However, upon consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing, this court concludes that Request 3 also was not made unequivocally. In order to reach this conclusion, the court has looked beyond the mere words spoken, as those words provide only the most superficial aid in determining whether petitioner's request was unequivocal. In this case, the inquiry into unequivocality must encompass more than mere semantics.

42. Most importantly, there is overwhelming evidence indicating that petitioner's prime motivation was to delay the trial, and that he did not

really want to relieve Ryan. See supra Findings of Fact 98-102. When this evidence is applied to petitioner's conduct throughout the state proceedings, an unmistakable pattern of manipulation and dishonesty emerges. Against this backdrop, any request made by petitioner must be carefully evaluated in order to discern his true motivations. In this instance, the court concludes that the only thing unequivocal about Request 3 was petitioner's unequivocal desire to delay the trial, as recognized by Judge Maas at the time. The request itself, while unequivocal to the naked ear, cannot be considered unequivocal when considered in the context of petitioner's ongoing attempts to frustrate the administration of justice.

43. Because the court alternatively concludes that each of the three disputed Faretta motions were made

equivocally, said motions were properly denied.

VI. ALLEGED IMPROPER ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

A. Findings of Fact

103. The trial court admitted into evidence three letters written by petitioner while he was in prison for burglary in 1973, each of which evidenced petitioner's extraordinary fear of prison and willingness to do anything to secure his release. See 52 R.T. 3228-29 (petitioner claims he was an informant; "I'm afraid to come out of my cell and I'm afraid to hear from home"); 52 R.T. 3230 ("I had been threatened quite a few times and I'm under great fear"); 52 R.T. 3232-3236 (petitioner offers to turn in his own brother and many others in exchange for leniency). Judge Orfield rules that the letters were relevant to motive, pursuant to the government's theory that petitioner

would do anything to avoid returning to prison, including killing a witness. 24 R.T. 324. Those portions of the letters which the judge found inappropriate were excised. See 52 R.T. 3208.

104. The trial court allowed Deputy Sheriff Parsons to testify to a conversation between Parsons and petitioner, which Parsons claimed occurred when he was securing petitioner's chains in prison. Parsons testified that petitioner stated, "All right, you have your fun, I'll have mine later." Parsons responded, "I thought you already had your fun," to which petitioner replied, "Yeah, and I'll kill a lot more, too, and you may be first on my list." 53 R.T. 3329. Judge Orfield ruled the testimony admissible as a spontaneous statement that was not the result of custodial interrogation. Id. at 3325.

105. By stipulation of counsel, the jury was informed that petitioner had purchased a saw, butcher knife, and two shanks of twine, while travelling in the victim's van, and after threatening to kill former girlfriend Donna Hatch. The trial court had ruled the evidence admissible, finding that the evidence indicated that petitioner might have intended to kill Hatch in the same manner as the victim in this case was killed, and for the same reason. 25 R.T. 387. Therefore, the court concluded that the purchases "might well show a consciousness on the part of the defendant of his guilt." Id.

106. The trial court admitted into evidence a letter written by petitioner to a friend, Theresa Roch, in which petitioner relates threats from a person named Quack to kill O'Connor, the prosecutors, the prosecution's

criminalist, "and at least one member of their family," if petitioner is convicted. 47 R.T. 2741. Petitioner notes in the letter that Quack seeks his approval for these murders, but he has not decided yet whether to give such approval. Id. Because petitioner knew that his outgoing mail was being read by the authorities, Judge Orfield ruled the letter admissible as an attempt to intimidate the prosecutors and the criminalist, who was a key witness. Id at 2738.

B. Conclusions of Law

44. In the federal habeas corpus context, a petitioner's attack on the correctness of state evidentiary rulings does not allege a cognizable deprivation of federal rights. Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). However, when a petitioner claims that the improper admission of evidence deprived him of due process under the

fourteenth amendment, he alleges a cognizable claim under § 2254. Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1068 (1987). In order to prove a due process violation, petitioner must demonstrate that "the admission of the evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair." Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Under this standard "the presence or absence of state law violation is largely beside the point." Id. at 919-20. However, "adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner . . . ." Id. at 919.

45. In this case, petitioner has fallen far short of the heavy burden he bears under the relevant authority. First of all, this court

concludes that the admission of the disputed evidence by Judge Orfield was not an abuse of discretion under the evidentiary laws of California. Each piece of evidence disputed by petitioner was relevant, and in each case the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. See Cal. Evid. Code § 352.[10/] Therefore, pursuant to Jammal there is at lest the suggestion of procedural fairness.

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10. The court recognizes that the California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, held that the admission of the three letters from 1973 was non-prejudicial error, but that the other items were admitted properly. See Hamilton I, 41 Cal.3d at 424-30. While the California Supreme Court held that the theory of motive with respect to the 1973 letters "simply does not wash," Hamilton I, 41 Cal.3d at 426, this court disagrees. Petitioner's aversion to incarceration went well beyond that experienced by most defendants and former convicts, and he threatened to kill Donna Hatch when it appeared her perceived intransigence might also damage his ability to stay out of jail. Under these circumstances, it is hardly speculative to theorize as to the desire of a burglar to kill an eyewitness.

46. Even if one or more of the pieces of evidence were admitted improperly, petitioner has not demonstrated fundamental unfairness. While the evidence may have damaged petitioner's defense, it is not the type of evidence that "necessarily prevents a fair trial." Kealohapauole, 800 F.2d at 1465; see also Jammal, 920 F.2d at 921. As this court has already found, the evidence arrayed against petitioner was overwhelming, see Finding of Fact 73, and the evidentiary items disputed here were peripheral to the primary thrust of the prosecution's case. Therefore, even if one or more of the items was admitted improperly, this court concludes that petitioner's trial was not offensive to the fourteenth amendment.

VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT BY THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

A. Findings of Fact

107. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court initially affirmed petitioner's conviction, but reversed the findings of special circumstances and the judgment of death. Hamilton I, supra note 1. The court held that the trial judge's failure to instruct that intent to kill was an element of the felony-murder special circumstances, in accordance with Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.3d 131 (1983), and mandated reversal of the death penalty judgment. Hamilton I, 41 Cal.3d at 431-32.

108. The Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's petition for a writ of certiorari, ordered the judgment of the California Supreme Court vacated, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision

in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986). California v. Hamilton, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986). In Rose, the Court held that the doctrine of harmless error may apply to jury instructions which erroneously shift the burden of proof to the defendant, provided that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rose, 478 U.S. at 579-82.

109. Prior to remand by the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.3d 1104 (1987), in which the court overruled Carlos and held that intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance, except when the defendant is an aider and abettor rather that the actual killer.

110. Upon revisiting the instant matter on remand, the California Supreme Court stated that the entire cause

was before the court "because the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Hamilton I and rendered the decision a nullity." Hamilton II, 45 Cal.3d at 363. Moreover, the court reasoned that "the doctrine of law of the case does not bar reconsideration of any point decided in Hamilton I. The doctrine may be applied only when and to the extent the prior decision was binding force. Because the judgment in Hamilton I was vacated, that decision, of course, is a nullity and as such has no binding force." Id. (citation omitted).

111. With the scope of review thus defined, the California Supreme Court reexamined Hamilton I in its entirety, and affirmed the judgment of death pursuant to Anderson. In applying Anderson, the California Supreme Court recognized that "there was no evidence that [petitioner] was an aider and

abettor." Hamilton II, 45 Cal.3d at 364. Therefore, "the court did not err by failing to instruct on intent." Id. Because the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge was not required to instruct on intent, it declined to reach the issue of whether the failure to so instruct constituted harmless error under Rose. Id.

B. Conclusions of Law

47. This court concludes that petitioner suffered no constitutional deprivation as a result of the California Supreme Court's application of Anderson in Hamilton II. After the United States Supreme Court vacated Hamilton I, the California Supreme Court was procedurally free to reexamine all aspects of its initial decision, including its erroneous conclusion that the trial court was required to instruct on intent to kill. Petitioner's death sentence has been

rendered neither arbitrary nor unreliable by the California Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton II.

48. Nor does the doctrine of law of the case preclude the California Supreme Court's reexamination if its earlier ruling. Indeed, the doctrine recognizes an exception where there has been an intervening change in the law. See George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291 (1989).

49. Moreover, the California Supreme Court's retroactive application of Anderson does not constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The California Supreme Court has explicitly held that there is no violation of federal due process where Anderson is applied to felony murders occurring before Carlos, as in this case.

People v. Poggi, 45 Cal.3d 306, 327 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). Most importantly, "Carlos itself concluded that the statute was ambiguous with respect to the requirement of intent to kill for a felony-murder special circumstance." Id. Therefore, "[t]here was ample basis for pre-Carlos foreseeability of a holding that such intent is not required for the actual killer." Id. With respect to petitioner's assertion of federal rights, this court agrees with the Poggi analysis. Cf. In re Baert, 205 Cal.App.3d 514 (1988) (ex post facto principles require Carlos instruction where crime occurred during four year window between Carlos and Anderson), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3242 (1989).

50. In addition, the California Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton II does not constitute an equal

protection violation. When the state prosecutes criminal defendants, the results for those similarly situated will not always be consistent, for a variety of procedural and substantive reasons. However, in alleging an equal protection violation, petitioner must do more than challenge the timing of the decisions rendered through the appellate process. The mere fact that said timing created an unfortunate result from his perspective will not support the conclusion that the criminal laws are being disparately enforced to his constitutional detriment.

51. Nor does the California Supreme Court's failure to notify the parties of its intent to apply Anderson constitute a violation of procedural due process. There is no federal constitutional right which requires that petitioner be allowed to brief every single issue presented to the

appellate court. With respect to petitioner's alleged state entitlement under Cal. Govt. Code § 68081, any error under that section does not give rise to a federal claim for relief under § 2254. At any rate, the alleged failure to comply with Cal. Govt. Code § 68081 was harmless as the application of Anderson to this case was unavoidable and straightforward.

52. Finally, even if the California Supreme Court erred by going beyond the scope of the remand order and/or by applying Anderson retroactively, this court holds as a matter of law that such error was harmless as Rose clearly mandated reversal of Hamilton I. The failure of the trial court to instruct on intent to kill in this case was harmless under Rose as the evidence conclusively demonstrated that the victim was killed intentionally. See Hamilton I, 41 Cal.3d 408, 438 ("[T]he condition of Mrs.

Buchanan's body amply established an intent to kill in the absence of any evidence in the record supporting the majority's accidental death theory . . . . It is simply inconceivable that, if the killing were indeed 'accidental,' defendant would have neglected to attempt to prove that fact.") (Lucas, J., dissenting). Therefore, the reversal of Hamilton I was inevitable even if the California Supreme Court had not acted in the manner now challenged by petitioner.

VIII. ALLEGED IMPROPER JURY INSTRUCTIONS

A. Mandatory Sentencing Instruction

(a) Findings of Fact

112. At the close of the penalty phase, the jury was instructed pursuant to former CALJIC No. 8.84.2, which incorporated the mandatory sentencing language of Cal. Penal Code 190.3:

> After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard

> and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole.

70 R.T. 4669.

113. At petitioner's request, the court also instructed the jury, "In weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors you are not to merely count numbers on either side. You are instructed rather to weigh and consider the factors on each side as a whole." Id. at 4664 (emphasis supplied).

114. During his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor stated, "The issue of determining the punishment

for these horrendous crimes rests in your discretion, guided by some factors, but not limited to those factors . . . . [I]t is going to be your decision. You are the members of the community and you are the conscience of the community, and you will be called upon to make this tremendous decision, tough decision . . . ." Id. at 4620. Near the end of his argument, the prosecutor observed, "So, ladies and gentlemen, you are the ones who have to add up and come to the total how does the alleged mitigation stack up against the overwhelming aggravation." Id. at 4641.

115. During his penalty phase argument, Ryan stated, "[I]t is for the jury to determine the appropriate punishment. If you find that one single factor in mitigation is sufficient to return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole, that is your choice." Id. at 4650. Near the end of

his argument, Ryan informed the jury, "You ladies and gentlemen are never going to be asked to make such a decision again. You are going to be asked whether or not this man lives or dies,and it is your decision." Id. at 4660.

(b) Conclusions of Law

53. Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court's recognition that former CALJIC 8.84.2 "leave[s] room for some confusion as to the jury's role," People v. Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, n.17 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the instruction. Boyde v. California, 110 S.Ct. 1190 (1990).

54. In Boyde, petitioner claimed that the instruction violated the eighth amendment because it prevented the jury from making an individualized

assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty. Id. at 1196. The Court rejected this argument, finding that "the mandatory language of CALJIC 8.84.2 is not alleged to have interfered with the consideration of mitigating evidence." Id. The Court concluded that "[p]etitioner's claim that the `shall impose' language of CALJIC 8.84.2 unconstitutionally prevents `individualized assessment' by the jury is thus without merit." Id.

55. In this case, petitioner's attempt to distinguish Boyde is wholly unpersuasive. While in Boyde there was no allegation that the mandatory language interfered with consideration of the mitigating evidence, here there is simply no evidence suggesting such interference. This court concludes that the supplemental instruction given by the court, as well as the closing arguments of

the prosecutor and defense counsel, clearly indicate that the jury was able to perform an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty and did not mechanically weigh the factors in reaching its decision.

56. Furthermore, the disputed instruction did not create an unconstitutional presumption that death was the appropriate penalty, as it allowed the jury to consider all factors in mitigation, and to reject the death penalty even if only one mitigating factor persuaded them that life imprisonment was the appropriate penalty. The prosecutor's closing argument, including his comment with respect to the victim, do not alter the conclusions of this court.

57. For these reasons, this court concludes that the use of the mandatory sentencing language under these

circumstances was not constitutionally impermissible.

B. The Factor (k) Instruction

(a) Findings of Fact

116. After Ryan presented his penalty phase case, which consisted almost entirely of evidence of petitioner's character and background, see R.T. 4587-4613, the court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC 8.84.1: "In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. You shall take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable." 70 R.T. 4662. Among the factors to be considered was former factor (k): "Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it was not legal excuse for the crime." (Id. at 4664.

117. After instructing the jury on the factors to be considered, the court stated, "The mitigating circumstances which I have read for your consideration are given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence on Mr. Hamilton. But you should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. You may also consider any other circumstances presented as reasons for not imposing the death penalty." Id at 4664-65.

118. The prosecutor argued that "[t]here is (sic) absolutely no extenuating circumstances whatsoever, no extenuating circumstances in the way that he beat, robbed and kidnapped and killed that poor victim." Id at 4636. After restating the absence of any extenuating

circumstances, and while still arguing on this issue, the prosecutor observed, "He doesn't even have the broken home excuse. He had a good home life." Id. The prosecutor then attempted to rebut certain of the mitigating circumstances presented by the defense, all of which went to the victim's background. Id. at 4637-39.

(b) Conclusions of Law

58. Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court's conclusion that the language of factor (k) might mislead jurors about the scope of their discretion, People v. Easley, 34 Cal.3d 858 (1983), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of factor (k) as used in this case. Boyde, 110 S.Ct. at 1201.

59. In Boyde, as here, petitioner claimed "that the 'catch-all' factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider and give effect to non-crime-

related mitigating evidence because its language . . . limits the jury to other evidence that was related to the crime." Boyde, 110 S.Ct. at 1197. In considering factor (k), the Court established the standard to be applied by this court: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 1198.

60. In upholding the constitutionality of factor (k), the Court observed that "[p]etitioner had an opportunity through factor (k) to argue that his background and character 'extenuated' or 'excused' the seriousness of the crime, and we see no reason to believe that reasonable jurors would resist the view, 'long held by society,' that in an appropriate case such evidence would counsel imposition of a sentence

less than death." Id. at 1199. The Court squarely rejected petitioner's contention that the language of factor (k) limited the jury's consideration only to circumstances directly related to the crime. Id. at 1199.

61. Moreover, the Court noted that when factor (k) is considered in the context of the other factors, which do allow for consideration of mitigating evidence not associated with the crime itself, "it seems even more improbable that jurors would arrive at an interpretation that precludes consideration of all non-crime-related evidence." Id. The Court further reasoned that all of the defense evidence presented at the penalty phase related to petitioner's background and character, "and we think it unlikely that reasonable jurors would believe the court's instructions transformed all of this

'favorable testimony into a virtual charade.'" Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987)).

62. Finally, the Court also considered petitioner's contention that "arguments by the prosecutor immediately before the jury's sentencing deliberations reinforced an impermissible interpretation of factor (k) and made it likely that jurors would arrive at such an understanding." Id. at 1200. With respect to this allegation, which is identical to that made by petitioner here, the Court noted that "arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court." Id. In Boyde, as here, the prosecutor's "principal tack was not to contend that background and character were irrelevant, but to urge the jury that despite petitioner's past difficulties, he must accept responsibility for his actions."

Id. at 1200. The Court concluded that this type of argument did not unconstitutionally taint factor (k).

63. Again, petitioner's attempt to distinguish Boyde is singularly weak. In this case, the jury received substantial evidence concerning petitioner's background and character, which the prosecution strenuously and properly attempted to rebut. Moreover, the trial court in this case explicitly informed the jury that they were not limited in considering only those factors in mitigation which he had listed. In addition, as the Court has instructed, factor (k) must be viewed in the context of the other factors, which do allow for non-crime mitigating evidence. Therefore, it is clear that there is absolutely no likelihood that the jury applied factor (k) in a way that prevented the

consideration of petitioner's background and character evidence.

64. For these reasons, this court concludes that the use of factor (k) under these circumstances was not constitutionally impermissible.

C. Modified Briggs Instruction

(a) Findings of Fact

119. At the time of petitioner's trial, state law mandated that the trial court instruct the jury on the Governor's authority to commute a life sentence, even where such sentence was imposed without possibility of parole. See former Cal. Penal Code § 190.3; former CALJIC 8.84.2. The so-called Briggs instruction provided in relevant part:

> You are instructed that under the state constitution, a governor is empowered to grant a reprieve, pardon or commutation after sentence following conviction of a crime. Under this power a governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to

> a lesser sentence that would include the possibility of parole.

After Ryan objected to the instruction, the parties reached an agreement on a modified Briggs instruction, which began with the language quoted above, but contained the following substantial explanatory provisions:

> This is subject to the requirement that, in the case of any person twice convicted of a felony, a commutation or modification may not be granted absent the written recommendation of at least four justices of the California Supreme Court. Further, a life sentence requires a minimum incarceration of 25 years less one-third off for good time credits before parole may be considered by the proper authorities. You are now instructed, however, that the matter of a possible commutation or modification of sentence is not to be considered by you in determining the punishment for Mr. Hamilton. You must not speculate as to whether such commutation or modification would ever occur. It is not your function to decided now whether this man will be suitable for parole at some future date. So far as you are

> concerned, you are to decide only whether this man shall suffer the death penalty or whether he shall be permitted to remain alive. If upon consideration of the evidence you believe that life imprisonment without possibility of parole is the proper sentence, you must assume that the Governor, the Supreme Court, and those officials charged with the operation of our parole system will perform their duty in a correct and responsible manner, and that Mr. Hamilton will not be paroled unless he can be safely released into society. It would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to fix the penalty at death because of a doubt that the Governor and other officials will properly carry out their responsibilities.

70 R.T. 4667-69.

120. During the penalty phase argument, the prosecutor stated, "This defendant wouldn't spend all his time in prison thinking about his horrible crimes. He'd be conniving and devising ways to manipulate the system and get out." Id. at 4645-46. Petitioner claims that this statement, because it implied he

might be able to get out of prison, eviscerated the court's attempts to instruct the jury that they were not to consider petitioner's potential for parole.

(b) Conclusions of Law

65. In California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the unmodified Briggs instruction. The Court held that the instruction "gives the jury accurate information of which both the defendant and his counsel are aware, and it does not preclude the defendant from offering any evidence or argument regarding the Governor's power to commute a life sentence." Id. at 1004. Moreover, the Court rejected the defendant's contention that the Briggs Instruction is constitutionally infirm because it deflects the jury's focus from its central task." Id. at 1005. "In sum, the Briggs

Instruction does not violate any of the substantive limitations this Court's precedents have imposed on the capital sentencing process." Id. at 1013.[11/]

66. The modified Briggs Instruction given in this case is not constitutionally infirm, even when considered in connection with the prosecutor's remark anticipating petitioner's future attempts to get out of prison. Most importantly, the modifications agreed to by the parties improved the unmodified Briggs Instruction from the defense perspective. In this regard, it should be noted that the impetus behind the modification came from petitioner's trial counsel, who was

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11. On remand, the California Supreme Court found the Briggs Instruction incompatible with the state constitution. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 (1984). This result, of course, does not affect this court's inquiry of a federal habeas petition.

seeking to mitigate the impact of the unmodified Briggs Instruction.

67. The modifications accepted by the court operated to petitioner's benefit in two ways. First, the information concerning the actual logistics of commutation suggest that the possibility of parole for petitioner in this case is remote. This counteracts the potentiality that a jury may impose death simply because of its fear that a life sentence will be substantially shortened by the authorities. Second, the admonition not to consider the possibility of modification or commutation is significant, and there is nothing in the record which would lead this court to speculate that the jury either did not hear or did not listen to the trial judge's admonition. See Boyde, 110 S.Ct. at 1200 (impact of jury instructions not lessened by contrary arguments by counsel;

instructions are "viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law").

68. The prosecutor's remark described above, see Finding of Fact 120, does not change this result, nor does it suggest that the jury was encouraged to speculate as to whether petitioner was likely to be paroled. Taken in context, it is clear that the prosecutor's contention was not directed, either implicitly or explicitly, towards the commutation power of the governor. Rather, this court concludes that the comment, which refers primarily to petitioner's lack of remorse, reflects the prosecutor's proper desire to convey to the jury petitioner's manipulative personality and inability to think of anybody but himself. Therefore, the comment did not taint the modified Briggs Instruction.

69. For the reasons stated above, this court concludes that the reading of the modified Briggs Instruction was not constitutionally infirm.

IX. ADJOURNMENT OF THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS

A. Findings of Fact

121. On December 18, 1980, after the jury had deliberated for approximately 2.5 days, the court consulted with the jury and ordered an adjournment of deliberations until January 5, 1981. 65 R.T. 1. The court ordered the adjournment because of the pendency of the holidays and at least one juror's inability to deliberate in the week immediately preceding Christmas. Id.

122. Petitioner claims that he never assented to the adjournment, and petitioner has testified before this court that he protested to trial counsel,

who did not enter a formal objection. IV E.H. 161-62.

123. Petitioner has not introduced juror affidavits or other evidence suggesting that any of the jurors acted improperly during the break by discussing the case with others or by failing to avoid media coverage of the case.

B. Conclusions of Law

70. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the adjournment. It is well within the province of the court to allow a deliberating jury to break for the holidays; to hold otherwise would virtually ensure the unavailability of jurors to serve on long trials.

71. Even if the adjournment violated some discrete aspect of state law, see e.g., People v. Santamaria, 229 Cal.App.3d 269 (1991) (no

good cause for eleven day adjournment after one day of deliberations, where only reason for adjournment is trial judge's unspecified plans), this court concludes that such violation did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to due process.

X. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS FILED IN PROPRIA PERSONA

A. Findings of Fact

124. As noted above, although petitioner's counsel filed an amended petition on his behalf, petitioner was permitted to file amendments in propria persona to the petition in consolidated case 90-0291-B. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Although petitioner has been represented by highly competent counsel in these proceedings, his perpetual dissatisfaction with his appointed attorneys convinced this court

that the pro per petition and its amendments should not be considered precluded by or subsumed under the amended petition filed by counsel.[12/] By this method, the court sought to ensure that petitioner's interests were protected by counsel, while at the same time allowing

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12. While petitioner's dissatisfaction with counsel in this proceeding has been perpetual, it has never been meritorious. The court has denied petitioner's motions to relieve one or both habeas counsel on three occasions. See Nunc Pro Tunc Order, December 17, 1990 (finding "no evidence suggesting that Mr. Benzian has provided ineffective assistance of counsel . . . ."); Order, January 23, 1991 ("The court views petitioner's request to relieve both counsel as a dilatory tactic, and the court notes that in its view both counsel are working diligently and effectively on behalf of petitioner."); Order, August 19, 1991 (The court's conclusions with respect to counsel's performance have only been reinforced by effective representation during evidentiary hearing and in post-hearing brief). Notwithstanding these orders, the unique posture of this case led the court to conclude that petitioner should not be silenced merely because his counsel were diligently pursuing those claims which they believed were legally and factually sound.

petitioner to assert all claims which he believed appropriate, even if counsel, for strategic reasons or otherwise, did not.

125. Respondents were ordered to respond to the pro per amendments, and petitioner was allowed to file his own traverse to that response. See Nunc Pro Tunc Order, December 17, 1990, para. 1; Order, January 23, 1991, para. 3.

126. The court's objective has never changed: a full and fair adjudication of all appropriate claims in one timely proceeding. Notwithstanding respondents' protests to petitioner's pro per role, see Answer on the Merits to Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Prisoner Represented by Counsel, p. 7, the court finds that this unusual procedure has been appropriate in the unique context of this case, as petitioner's counsel have provided extensive and learned assistance,

while petitioner has been afforded every opportunity to put before the court all claims which he contends had been previously ignored.

127. In the pro per petition filed in 90-0291-B on March 7, 1990, and the pro per amendments thereto, filed on October 18, 1990, petitioner has raised four grounds in support of his request for relief: (1) false representation of the facts and evidence by the prosecution; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (3) denial of right to self-representation; (4) denial of the right to fair trial and due process.

128. Petitioner's first claim, false representation of the facts and evidence by the prosecution, alleges that the district attorney improperly introduced the knife, saw, and rope, and further alleges that the district attorney

"covered up" perjury by deputy coroner Cogen.

129. Petitioner's second claim, ineffective assistance of counsel, alleges that trial and appellate counsel failed to investigate certain evidentiary items. This claim also raises the issue of Ryan's shackling request and Ryan's trial performance.

130. Petitioner's third claim, denial of the right to self-representation, alleges that the trial judge improperly denied petitioner's timely Faretta motions.

131. Petitioner's fourth claim, denial of the right to a fair trial and due process, alleges that the trial court was prejudiced against petitioner, improperly admitted certain evidentiary items, improperly instructed the jury, and systematically excluded black jurors. Moreover, petitioner alleges that the

California Supreme Court exceeded its scope of review upon remand in Hamilton II, and improperly denied his motions to relieve or appoint specified counsel on four occasions. Finally, petitioner alleges in this claim that the California Appellate Project utilized racial prejudice in appointing counsel for petitioner in February, 1990.

132. This court has carefully considered the extremely limited factual allegations supporting each ground for relief, and has reviewed the trial record in connection with each of petitioner's pro per claims.

B. Conclusions of Law

72. Petitioner's allegations concerning the district attorney's introduction of the knife, rope, and saw were raised by counsel, and are foreclosed by this court's ruling that the admission of this evidence did not

deprive petitioner of a fair trial. See supra Conclusions of Law 44-46. Moreover, petitioner's claim that the district attorney engaged in a "cover-up" of perjured testimony is unsupported by any evidence in the trial record or the evidentiary hearing record, and must be summarily dismissed.

73. Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was raised by counsel and is foreclosed by this court's ruling that petitioner was represented in an effective and constitutional manner. See Conclusions of Law 14, 23-26. The court recognizes that the pro per petition asserts a number of alleged investigative and performance failures that were not discussed above. However, upon review of these allegations, the court finds that petitioner has failed to raise a constitutional issue inasmuch as each allegation involves evidentiary

minutiae and does not even approach the standard of incompetence and prejudice articulated in Strickland. To the extent petitioner contends that appellate and/or habeas counsel were also deficient for failing to investigate these issues, the same conclusion applies.

74. Petitioner's Faretta claim was raised by counsel and is squarely foreclosed by this court's ruling that petitioner moved to represent himself in an equivocal manner and for purposes of delay. See Conclusions of Law 36-43.

75. Petitioner's claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence was raised by counsel and is foreclosed by this court's ruling that the evidence was legally admissible and the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner. See Conclusions of Law 44-46. The court recognizes that the pro per petition addresses certain evidentiary

decisions not raised in counsel's petition. However, the court concludes that the questioned rulings involve discrete evidentiary items and do not implicate petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial.

76. Petitioner's attack on the jury instructions was raised by counsel and is foreclosed by this court's prior ruling that the instructions were not unconstitutional. See Conclusions of Law 57, 64, 69. Likewise, petitioner's attack on the California Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton II was raised by counsel and is foreclosed by this court's ruling that the decision was a lawful exercise of that court's power. See Conclusions of Law 47-52.

77. Petitioner has presented absolutely no evidence indicating that the trial judge was prejudiced against him or that black

jurors were systematically excluded from the jury. These very serious charges are made in a conclusory fashion in the pro per petition, and are totally unsupported in the record. Therefore, these claims warrant summary dismissal.

78. Petitioner's claim that the California Supreme Court improperly denied his motions to relieve or appoint counsel are unsupported by the record and do not raise constitutional issues. These claims reflect petitioner's misguided belief that he is entitled to counsel of his choice throughout appellate and habeas proceedings. The constitution does not afford petitioner this luxury, and his claims are wholly without merit. Likewise, petitioner's claim that the California Appellate Project utilized racial prejudice in appointing him counsel is unsupported by any evidence. These claims warrant summary dismissal.

79. As noted above, many of the pro per claims raised by petitioner were pursued by counsel and have already been addressed by this court. With respect to the claims prosecuted by petitioner in propria persona, this court concludes that said claims are unsupported by any evidence and/or do not state issues of constitutional magnitude. Instead, these claims reflect petitioner's willingness to assert frivolous claims in an effort to delay the proceedings, manipulate the judicial system, and obfuscate the real issues. This court's reading of the trial record indicates that this has been petitioner's objective since he was first arrested and launched the "Fran and Spider" story.

XI. CLAIMS WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY BARRED FROM SUBSEQUENT PETITIONS

A. Findings of Fact

133. As discussed above, see supra p. 4, petitioner was ordered by this court on March 6, 1990 to identify all potential habeas claims of which he was aware. On June 8, 1990, petitioner filed a list of 36 potentially new claims. Subsequently, petitioner was given until October 22, 1990 to file any unexhausted claims in state court and any exhausted claims in federal court. This court ruled that any claims not brought by the deadline were waived and abandoned.

134. The following claims were identified in petitioner's list of potential claims filed with this court on June 8, 1990: (1) failure to investigate the Jessie Moffett theory; (2) petitioner's inability to communicate effectively with counsel by reason of

mental or emotional impairment; (3) counsel's failure to raise this inability; (4) denial of expert psychiatric assistance; (5) introduction of evidence obtained by government officials incident to petitioner's unlawful arrest; (6) introduction at trial of petitioner's statement to Deputy Parsons in violation of the fifth amendment; (7) introduction at trial of petitioner's statement to a police informant; (8) unlawful jury instruction stating that adverse inferences could be drawn from petitioner's failure to explain or deny evidence against him during his testimony; (9) ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to seek a change of venue; (10) selection of jury in a manner that violated the right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community; (11) improper exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecution; (12)

improper communication between trial court and jurors outside of presence of counsel; (13) excessive security during trial; (14) improper admission of (a) knife, saw, and rope, (b) petitioner's 1972 burglary conviction; (c) petitioner's statements to Donna Hatch; (d) petitioner's letter to Terry Buchanan; (e) petitioner's letter to Theresa Roch; (15) improper admission into evidence of preliminary hearing testimony of Stephen Terry; (16) improper denial of Faretta motions; (17) improper admission of petitioner's 1972 burglary conviction (repeat of 14(b)); (18) trial court's failure to instruct jury on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery; (19) improper jury instruction indicating that petitioner's 1972 burglary conviction could be used as evidence of motive; (20) improper jury instruction indicating that evidence of the presence of motive could tend to establish guilt; (21) improper

jury instruction that flight after the commission of a crime may be considered as consciousness of guilt; (22) improper jury instruction on malice aforethought; (23) use of unconstitutional felony murder and special circumstances statute; (24) imposition of death penalty in a disproportionate and discriminatory manner when compared with sentences in other cases involving defendants and victims of other races; (25) improper burglary instruction; (26) improper jury instruction indicating that auto burglary may serve as a basis for first degree felony murder and special circumstances; (27) improper exclusion of documentary film during sentencing phase; (28) improper penalty phase instructions that precluded the jury from considering and giving effect to all relevant mitigating evidence; (29) failure to instruct the jury that death penalty verdict could be

returned only if death was the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt; (30) failure to instruct the jury that a death sentence can also be commuted by the governor; (31) failure to instruct the jury that robbery, burglary, and kidnapping should be regarded as a single special circumstance; (32) refusal of the court to exclude aggravating factors that were not listed on the prosecutor's notice of aggravation; (33) improper instruction on irrelevant mitigating factors and prosecutor's argument pointing out absence of such factors; (34) prosecutorial misconduct in penalty phase argument; (35) ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to investigation and presentation of potential mitigating factors; and (36) to the extent any of the above claims were not preserved, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to preserve such claims.

135. Of the 36 potential claims identified on June 8, 1990, only the following five were presented to this court prior to the October 22, 1990 deadline: (6) improper admission of statement to Deputy Parsons; (11) improper use of peremptory challenges by prosecution; (14) improper admission of certain evidentiary items; (16) improper denial of Faretta motions; and (28) improper penalty phase instruction that limited jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence. Each of these claims, and all other exhausted claims presented to the court in a timely manner, have been considered by the court. None of the other claims identified above were presented to this court prior to the October 22, 1990 due date.

136. One of the claims identified by petitioner on June 6, 1990, the alleged "Jessie Moffett theory," was

raised by petitioner nearly thirteen months later, in support of his Application for Stay of Proceedings, filed with this court on July 1, 1991. This application came approximately two months after the evidentiary hearing conducted by this court was concluded, and marked the first time that petitioner ever attempted to develop the Moffett theory before this court, despite its identification in June, 1990, and despite petitioner's admission that he received discovery giving rise to the theory in March, 1990. This court denied the application for stay, finding that petitioner's wilful disregard of the October 22, 1990 deadline required that the Moffett theory be deemed waived and abandoned. See Order, August 19, 1991. Petitioner's attempt to raise the claim at this stage of the proceedings reflects an attempt to file seriatim petitions and

amendments, and is precluded by this court's earlier orders.

B. Conclusion of Law

80. Those claims listed above and not presented to this court prior to the October 22, 1990 deadline are hereby deemed waived and abandoned pursuant to this court's order of September 18, 1990. This ruling specifically encompasses all claims listed in Finding of Fact 132, as well as any other claims of which petitioner was aware, which were not filed with this court prior to October 22, 1990.

XII. Conclusion

This court recognizes its role as a guardian of those constitutional rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant. Of course, in a capital case the importance of this role is magnified by an immeasurable amount. Accordingly, the court has given its maximum consideration

to every claim raised by petitioner, and has done everything in its power to analyze whether petitioner's trial was conducted in a constitutional manner.

Without prejudicing the valid rights of respondents, this court has endeavored to afford petitioner every opportunity to present all claims to this court on a fully developed record. This effort included a three week evidentiary hearing which only concluded when petitioner rested. Meanwhile, the state has been forced to answer and litigate many issues of dubious constitutional importance, all the while holding a judgment of death that now approaches its eleventh anniversary.

After carefully considering every claim presented, this court is convinced that petitioner received a fair trial and was convicted and sentenced in a constitutional manner. For all of the reasons described above, the amended and

consolidated petitions for writ of habeas corpus are hereby denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 8-23-91
3:30 pm

/S/ RUDI M. BREWSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Hamilton v. Vasquez and Lungren
Civ. No. 86-2102-B and Civ. No. 90-0291-B
Order Denying Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

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APPENDIX C

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Filed March 31, 1994

BERNARD LEE HAMILTON,	)	Nos. 91-56251
	)	91-56252
Petitioner-Appellant,	)	91-56295
	)	91-56403
vs.	)	91-80385
	)	93-55039
DANIEL VASQUEZ, * Warden of San Quentin; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	)	D.C. Nos. CV-86-2101-RMB
	)	CV-90-291-RMB
Respondents-Appellees.	)	
	)	ORDER

Before: SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b), the Motion to Stay Issuance of Mandate is GRANTED for 30 days form the date of this order.

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* Arthur Calderon, the current Warden of San Quentin, is substituted for Daniel Vasquez, the former Warden. See Fed. R. App. Pro. 43(c)(1).